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ABSTRACT
Two Essays on Medicaid Dental Care Coverage
by
Sasha Brodsky
Chair: Thomas Buchmueller
My dissertation investigates the role of Medicaid dental insurance for children and adults
on provider participation and the use of dental care. My job market paper focuses on the
effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the demand for preventive and urgent care.
I exploit changes in Medicaid dental care coverage for adults within states over the last
twenty years. Using individual-level SIPP data, I find that, by lowering the effective price
of care, Medicaid dental care coverage increases the probability that adults on Medicaid
will go to the dentist office at least once a year. Further analysis using data on hospital
emergency department (ED) discharges in California indicates no offset effect of Medicaid
dental care coverage on the number of ED visits for dental disease. Returning to SIPP data,
I find that Medicaid dental care coverage leads to substantial reductions in the number
of days spent in bed among employed adults on Medicaid. These results point to sizable
effects of insurance coverage on labor participation that have remained largely unexplored.
Dental care is not included in the Affordable Care Act as an ‘essential benefit’ that
must be covered by health plans participating in health insurance exchanges. Increased
enrollment in Medicaid will create additional fiscal pressure for those states that currently
cover dental care for adults on Medicaid. My findings indicate that, on the one hand, states
x
can substantially reduce short-term Medicaid costs by eliminating dental care coverage,
as offset effects through increased ED visits are minimal. On the other hand, based on
the results on the number of days in bed, such policy could have important effects on
productivity and health.
Dental care shares many features of primary care and preventive care, so the results
above have implications for Medicaid expansions of coverage of preventive care and pri-
mary care. They suggest that access to preventive care due to the Affordable Care Act will
not reduce the use of emergency care, so medical costs will increase. Changes in insurance
coverage will have implications for businesses and local economies. For example, reduced
absenteeism among working adults will raise firm productivity and increase government
budgets through higher tax revenue.
The rest of my dissertation focuses on the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the
supply of dental care. I exploit recent changes in insurance coverage due to Healthy Kids
Dental (HKD), an innovative program in Michigan aimed at improving children’s access to
dental care by increasing the willingness of dental providers to treat children on Medicaid.
The key feature of the program is that the state contracts with a private insurer, Delta Dental,
to provide dental coverage to children in selected counties. Delta then reimburses providers
according to the same fee schedule used for its commercially insured groups, a fee that is
substantially above the normal Medicaid rate. My analysis focuses on the expansion of
the program to two more counties in 2008. These make up about 6 percent of Michigan’s
population. I also exploit the change in fees in four additional counties that joined the
program in 2012. These counties make up about 3 percent of Michigan’s population. I use
a difference-in-difference strategy and an event-study framework to identify the effect of
increased reimbursement rates on provider participation and the use of dental care.
The results suggest that providers respond to increased reimbursement rates by seeing
more patients on Medicaid: average number of participating dentists per county increases
from 199 to 271. Provider response is immediate and remains constant over time. Interest-
xi
ingly, the number of children on Medicaid per dentist remains unchanged. This observa-
tion may suggest that greater participation of dentists treating fewer children on Medicaid
comes at the expense of declines in participation of dentists treating large volumes of chil-
dren on Medicaid. In line with this hypothesis, increased reimbursement rates lead to very
small increases in the share of children on Medicaid with any dental care of about 3 per-
cent (mean=0.265). A similar increase is observed in the number of dental visits per child
enrolled in Medicaid. I find little evidence that increased reimbursement rates affect enroll-
ment in Medicaid, suggesting that the above effects are driven by increased use of dental
care.
These results underscore the importance of increased reimbursement rates to increasing
provider participation in Medicaid. As expected, higher reimbursement rates have larger ef-
fects on providers with lower volumes of Medicaid patients relative to providers with larger
volumes of Medicaid patients. This finding suggests that as reimbursement rates increase,
patients on Medicaid may be able to choose providers that better serve their needs (e.g.
providers who are located closer to their home). Providers are likely to treat more patients
as reimbursement rates increase, but increased reimbursement rates alone are unlikely to
raise the level of care up to the recommended levels.
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CHAPTER I
Measuring the Value of Prevention:
Evidence from Medicaid Dental Care Coverage
1.1 Introduction
Prevention is commonly seen as a way to improve health and contain medical costs.
With this logic in mind, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act significantly ex-
pands coverage of preventive care. Effective August 1, 2012, all new insurance plans must
cover certain preventive services, such as mammograms and colonoscopies. Other preven-
tion initiatives within ACA include raising reimbursement rates for primary care providers
and creating incentives for employers to provide wellness programs.
The effect of preventive insurance coverage on medical costs depends on the nature
of interaction among different types of covered services. Insurance coverage in general is
known to lead to greater utilization of medical services (Newhouse et al., 1996; Finkelstein
et al. 2012; Currie and Gruber, 1996), thereby directly increasing medical costs. However,
coverage for one type of care may lead to reductions in the use of other covered services,
thereby indirectly lowering total medical costs. For example, yearly visit to the dentist for
check-ups may reduce the need for emergency care due to untreated dental decay. Most
studies estimating these ‘offset effects’ focus on the effect of prescription drug coverage
1
on the use of hospital care.1 Evidence so far is mixed. For the elderly in the US in the
last decade, some studies report reductions in health care spending that more than offset
prescription drug spending (Shang and Goldman, 2007), while others find only moderate
offset effects (Hsu et al, 2006), or no offsets at all (Kaestner and Kahn 2012).
Preventive insurance coverage may improve health outcomes, thereby improving pro-
ductivity, but evidence for these effects is mixed. The two large-scale experiments in health
economics – the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE)2 and the Oregon Experiment3
– have found no evidence of large effect of health insurance on health. Improvements in
health may manifest themselves in increased productivity and reduced absenteeism, but
empirical evidence for these effects is scarce (Buchmueller, 2000). Vistnes (1997) finds
a positive association between health insurance and absenteeism, while Gilleskie (1998)
reports a negative association between health insurance and absenteeism.
This study estimates the effect of preventive coverage on the use of preventive care,
emergency care, and, indirectly, health in the context of dental care. Dentist office visits
are part of preventive care4, in that its goal is to minimize and prevent complications. In
contrast, dental care in hospital emergency departments (ED) is considered urgent care,
since hospitals are not equipped to provide dental services beyond basic alleviation of pain,
1One exception is Kaestner and LoSasso (2012) who use a natural experiment in which the price of
outpatient care decreased, while the price of inpatient care remained constant. They find increased use of
both types of care, especially for those conditions in which physicians exercise discretion. Since preventive
care could take place in both inpatient and outpatient setting, distinguishing the main effect of prevention
from its offset effect is difficult.
2The HIE was designed to investigate the marginal impact of insurance cost-sharing on utilization of
medical care (Newhouse et al, 1996). Non-elderly adults were randomly assigned to health insurance plans
that differed in the amount of cost-sharing required of patients at the time care was received. In addition
to estimating the effect of cost-sharing on medical care use, researchers examined its effect on a number of
indicators of physical and mental health. The effects of cost-sharing on health outcomes were not substantial
for the average person.
3In the Oregon Experiment, adults were assigned by lottery into Medicaid health insurance coverage.
Adults who gained insurance coverage used more care, but there was no evidence of an effect of insurance
coverage on self-reported physical health or mental health (Baicker, 2013).
4In the case of dental care, preventive care is commonly grouped into three levels. The goal of primary
prevention (e.g. X-ray) is to prevent disease from occurring. Secondary prevention is used after the onset
of disease, but before the development of its symptoms. An example of this type of prevention is amalgam
treatment before the onset of pain. Tertiary prevention aims to minimize damage after the development of
symptoms. For example, dentists may use an amalgam filling on a decayed tooth after the onset of pain.
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infection, and trauma.
While the federal government requires that all states cover emergency dental care for al-
leviation of pain, trauma, or infection for adults on Medicaid, public coverage of preventive
dental services is optional. As a result, there is considerable variation in Medicaid dental
care coverage across states (Figure 1.1). Most states in the north provide dental care cov-
erage for adults on Medicaid, while most states in the south do not. Moreover, there have
been changes in dental care coverage over time (Figure 1.2). Some states, like Arkansas,
added dental care coverage for adults on Medicaid in the last decade, while others, like
California, eliminated it in the same time period.
My analysis exploits variation of state-level Medicaid dental care coverage over time.
Using the national individual-level Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
from 2001, 2004, and 2008, I compare the use of care between adults on Medicaid and
other adults, controlling for observable time-varying and unobservable time-invariant state
characteristics that could affect both Medicaid dental coverage and the use of care. To
estimate the offset effect of Medicaid dental coverage, I focus on California, the largest
state in the U.S. that has eliminated dental care coverage for adults on Medicaid. Using
hospital discharge data from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State
Emergency Department Databases (SEDD) and county populations, I compare the number
of ED visits for dental disease per county population between adults on Medicaid and
other adults over time using event study and difference-in-difference approaches. Finally,
I return to the national SIPP data to estimate the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage
on the number of days spent in bed among adults on Medicaid. Evidence for this effect
suggests that, by improving health, preventive care coverage may improve productivity.
I find that Medicaid dental care coverage leads to a 23 percent increase in the probabil-
ity that patients will have at least one dentist office visit per year. Fewer adults on Medicaid
report foregoing dental care due to costs when Medicaid dental care coverage is provided,
suggesting that the reduction in the effective price of dental care drives the reduction in
3
the probability that adults on Medicaid have at least one dentist office visit per year. Addi-
tional analysis using data from California indicates no offset effect of Medicaid dental care
coverage on the number of ED visits for dental disease per population. At the same time,
I document substantial reductions in the number of bed days due to the policy: Medicaid
dental care coverage leads to a reduction of 8 percent in the number of bed days among
adults on Medicaid. Reduced number of bed days points to sizable effects of insurance on
productivity that have remained largely unexplored.
I organize my analysis as follows. Section 2 provides background on Medicaid dental
care coverage. In Section 3, I examine its effect on care use in dentist offices. Section
4 examines its offset effect on hospital ED care. I present evidence regarding the effect
of Medicaid dental care coverage on the number of bed days in Section 5. I discuss the
implications of my findings in Section 6, and conclude with Section 7.
1.2 Background
Dental care coverage is much less prevalent than medical care coverage in the United
States. About 15 percent of adults over the age of 21 have no form of medical care coverage,
but over 45 percent of adults over the age of 21 (85 million people) have no form of dental
care coverage (MEPS, 2005). Private dental insurance plans, usually received through
employment, are the largest providers of dental insurance. The second largest provider
of dental insurance is Medicaid, a joint federal-state program for parents and caregivers
in low-income families with dependent children, pregnant women, elderly5, disabled, and
other low-income adults.
The federal government requires states to provide emergency dental coverage for the
relief of pain, infection, or trauma to adults on Medicaid. In addition to mandatory dental
5The largest public provider of insurance for the elderly, Medicare, excludes most dental services from
coverage. The exclusion does not apply to inpatient dental services that are an integral part either of covered
procedures (e.g., reconstruction of the jaw following accidental injury), extractions done in preparation for ra-
diation treatment for neoplastic diseases involving the jaw, or oral examinations (but not treatment) preceding
kidney transplantation or heart valve replacement.
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care coverage, states have the option to cover a more comprehensive set of services. Some
states cover basic dental care that includes a broader set of urgent services for the relief of
pain, infection or trauma, such as smoothing of a broken tooth. Full dental care coverage
includes coverage of at least some preventive services, diagnostic, and restorative services.
Some states may exclude from coverage expensive treatments such as root canals, implants,
precious metal crowns, may still not be covered.
The breadth of comprehensive dental care coverage varies by state and over time. Most
Northeastern states, like New Jersey, covered dental care for over a decade (Figure 1.1 and
Table 1.1). Some states in the South, like Texas, never provided dental care coverage in the
last decade. A number of states, like California, eliminated dental care coverage. Between
2001 and 2011, the percentage of adults on Medicaid with dental care coverage dropped
from 80 to about 40 percent (Figure 1.2). Though most of this reduction took place in the
wake of the Great Recession, some states, like Alaska, Florida or Idaho, added coverage at
different points in time; some, like Massachusetts, eliminated it well before the recession;
others yet, like Washington, eliminated it after the recession.
Prior studies find that, compared to the demand for other types of care, demand for
dental care is price-elastic. In the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) moving from
the least comprehensive insurance plan to full coverage was associated with a 45 percent
increase in yearly spending (Newhouse et al, 1996). At low levels of cost-sharing (cost-
sharing of 0-25 percent), price elasticity of medical spending was 0.17, meaning that a 1
percent increase in the price of health care led to a 0.17 percent reduction in health care
spending. Cost-sharing rates between 25 and 95 percent yielded elasticity estimates of
0.22. Estimated elasticities of demand were larger for preventive care (0.43) and dental
care (0.46). These findings suggest that Medicaid dental care coverage may increase the
demand for care.
Medicaid dental care coverage is associated with greater use of care in dentist offices.
Using cross-sectional telephone survey data from years 2002 and 2004, Choi (2011) com-
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pares yearly dental service use of low-income parents in states with and without dental care
coverage for adults on Medicaid. Dental care coverage correlates with care use in dentist
offices: the probability of at least one dentist office visit per year is 6 percentage points
higher (mean of 0.50) in states that provide Medicaid dental care coverage.6
Case studies from several states’ hospital ED are suggestive of offset effects in dental
care. Wallace et al (2011) exploit the natural experiment that took place in Oregon. Their
strategy is to compare the use of dental care among adults on Medicaid who lost coverage
(parents and caregivers) to the analogous outcome among Medicaid beneficiaries who re-
tained it (disabled adults). When Oregon eliminated dental care coverage for parents and
caregivers of low-income children on Medicaid, the probability of dental diagnosis among
ED patients on Medicaid increased from 0.032 to 0.045 in this group. Disabled adults,
however, experienced a large reduction in ED use, perhaps because the program increased
co-payment for care in dentist offices at the same time. Cohen et al (2002) focus on the
elimination of dental care coverage for all adults on Medicaid that took place in Maryland
in 1993. Using data from all Maryland Medicaid claims, the authors find that the proba-
bility of dental diagnosis among ED patients increased from 1.00 percent to 1.11 percent,
when dental care coverage was eliminated.
6This evidence is consistent with previous estimates. Munkin and Trivedi (2009) estimate the relationship
between dental coverage and utilization using data from the nationally representative MEPS data from 1996 to
2000. The authors control for selection into dental coverage by using firm size as an instrument. They find that
private dental insurance coverage increases the number of general dental visits by 25 percent. Meyerhoeffer
et al (2013) confirm positive correlation between dental coverage and care use among non-elderly privately
insured and uninsured adults using data on individual use of dental care from the Medical Expenditures Panel
Survey for 2001-2006 merged to county-level prices for representative preventive and restorative treatments
from the American Dental Association survey. Private dental coverage increases the probability of preventive
care use by 19 percent and the use of restorative services by 11-16 percent.
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1.3 Effect of Medicaid Dental Care Coverage on the Use of Care in
Dentist Offices
Coverage of preventive care may lead to an increase in its use. I estimate this effect
by exploiting state-level variation in Medicaid dental care coverage over time. Any visit to
the dentist office is part of preventive care in that it minimizes complications from dental
disease. Since the American Dental Association recommends at least one yearly visit to
the dentist office, I consider as main outcomes the probability of at least one dentist office
visit in the past year and the number of dentist office visits in the past year. A measure of
foregone dental care in the past year allows me to examine whether Medicaid dental care
coverage affects the use of care through a reduction in its effective price.
1.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I examine the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the use of care in dentist of-
fices by using the national sample of civilian non-institutionalized population in the U.S.
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for 2001, 2004, and 2008.
Each panel is a multistage-stratified sample of the US civilian non-institutionalized pop-
ulation. Each individual is interviewed at most 12 times in the course of 4 years7 about
‘core’ questions on family income, family composition, and program participation over the
previous four months. In addition, during some interviews, individuals are asked ‘topical’
questions. The Medical Expenses and Utilization of Health Care Topical Module appears
roughly yearly; pooling data across all years results in over 650,000 observations. The
Adult Well-Being Topical Module is asked less frequently, so pooling data across all years
results in roughly 330,000 observations. Appendix Table 1.1 provides more detailed infor-
mation on the number of observations in each year.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.2. The observations are adult-years. Each
7Attrition rates vary between 25 percent and 35 percent across panels and waves.
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adult, defined as individual above the age of 21, contributes between one and three observa-
tions to the data.8 Overall, about 9 percent of adults in the sample are covered by Medicaid
in the last four months. Due to significant heterogeneity in key covariates and outcomes, I
distinguish between adults who are not covered by Medicaid, adults on Medicaid who are
parents and caregivers in low-income families with dependent children, and other adults
on Medicaid who are either elderly or disabled. Most non-Medicaid adults are employed.
Employment rate is slightly lower for parents of dependent children on Medicaid and sub-
stantially lower for other adults on Medicaid relative to adults who are not on Medicaid. In
line with this observation, very few non-elderly adults are covered by Medicare (presum-
ably because they are disabled), but over 45 percent of other adults are eligible for both
Medicaid and Medicare (‘dual eligibles’). Family income is highest among non-Medicaid
adults, and significantly lower for both types of adults on Medicaid.
I use different measures of utilization of care: the probability of at least one visit to the
dentist office, the number of dentist office visits, the probability of foregone care due to
costs, and the probability of at least one visit to the doctor’s office. Adults on Medicaid
use less dental care than other adults: they have a lower probability of at least one dentist
office visit per year and fewer dentist office visits relative to adults who are not covered by
Medicaid. This finding may suggest that adults on Medicaid residing in those states that
do not cover dental care go to the dentist office less often because they cannot afford it. To
test this hypothesis, I focus on a self-reported measure of foregone care. All adults in the
sample are asked whether there was a time in the past year when he or she needed to see a
dentist, but did not go. This variable takes on the value of 1 if the adult reports needing – but
foregoing – dental care, and 0 otherwise. The probability of foregone care is higher among
8The data include a weight for each respondent, corresponding to an estimated number of individuals in
the target population that each respondent represents. The basic components for individual weights include
a base weight that reflects the probability of selection for a sample unit, an adjustment for sub-sampling
within clusters, an adjustment for movers, a nonresponse adjustment to compensate for sample nonresponse,
and a post-stratification adjustment to correct for departures from known population totals. Because attrition
and nonresponse may be endogenous to participation in Medicaid, I do not use SIPP weights in the main
specifications. Including SIPP weight does not change the magnitude or statistical significance for the main
coefficients of interest. Results are available upon request.
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adults on Medicaid relative to other adults, suggesting that adults on Medicaid tend to face
more barriers to care than other adults. To test the plausibility of my results I focus on the
effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the probability of seeing a doctor in the past year.
Large effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on this variable could suggest that the use
of care among adults on Medicaid changes as state eliminate dental care coverage, thereby
complicating the causal interpretation for the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on
the use of care. I do no evidence for large effects of dental care coverage on the probability
of seeing a doctor in the past year.
By improving health outcomes, dental care coverage may improve productivity. One
measure of productivity is the time lost due to sickness absence as a share of working time.
This measure is not available in the data. Each adult in the sample, however, is asked to
report the number of days, including days at a hospital, that illness or injury kept him or
her in bed more than half of the day. Defined for only employed adults, this measure can
be interpreted as the lower bound of absenteeism. Raw number of bed days ranges from
0 to 365. To reduce the effect of outliers, I winsorize the top 1 percent of observations.
Winsorized number of bed days ranges from 0 to 150. Average number of bed days among
adults in the same is 4.14.9
Several state-level time-varying control variables help to account for changes that may
affect both Medicaid dental care coverage and the use of care among adults on Medicaid.
I control for changes in recessionary pressures by using gross domestic product per capita
in each state and year.10 These data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
To account for changes in the supply of dental care, I control for the number of dentists
per 1,000 residents in each year and state. This information is available from the American
Dental Association (ADA). Individuals who cannot obtain care in dentist offices may go to
9In 1989, average number of bed days among individuals over the age of 15 was 2.94 days. http:
//www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_176.pdf provides more statistics on the number of bed
days among different populations in the US.
10An alternative measure of local recessionary pressures is the unemployment rate. Using this measure of
recession does not affect the economic or statistical significance of the main coefficients of interest. Results
are available upon request.
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community health centers (CHC), so I control for the number of CHC in each state and year.
This information comes from the National Association of Community Health Centers.
1.3.2 Empirical Strategy
I identify the causal effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the use of care by using a
difference-in-difference (DID) approach: I compare changes in the outcome between adults
on Medicaid in states that change dental care coverage and other adults in the same states,
relative to the analogous changes in the outcome in states that do not change Medicaid
dental care coverage:
Yist = α1Full dentalst+α2Medicaidist+α3Full dentalstMedicaidist+α4Xist+εist , (1.1)
whereYist is the outcome of interest for adult i who lives in state s in year t, Full dentalst
takes on the value of 1 if adult i lives in a state where Medicaid provides full dental care
coverage for at least six months of year t,11 Medicaidist takes on the value of 1 if adult i is
covered by Medicaid in state s and year t, and Xist is a set of individual characteristics (gen-
der, race, age, marital status, insurance type, and family income), state fixed effects, state-
specific yearly time trends, interview month fixed effects, and time-varying state-specific
characteristics (gross state product per capita, and the number of active dentists12).13
11Some specifications also include an andicator variable, Basic dentalst , that takes on the value of 1 if
adult i lives in state s where Medicaid provides basic dental care coverage for at least six months of year t and
an interaction term, Full dentalstMedicaidist . Basic dental care coverage provides coverage only for urgent
dental care (e.g. extractions). If care in dentist offices is mostly preventive, then the effect of basic dental
care coverage on the probability of at least one dentist office visit should be minimal.
12Increases in Medicaid reimbursement to dentists may increase access to care in dentist offices. Changes
in reimbursement over time may bias the estimates. Decker (2011) shows that Medicaid dental payment levels
do not change significantly in inflation-adjusted terms between 2000 and 2008 for most states. The exceptions
to this trend are Connecticut, Indiana, Montana, New York, and Texas, and the District of Columbia that
increase fees by at least 50 percent between 2000 and 2008. As a robustness check, I exclude these states
from the analysis. The estimates do not change in either economic or statistical significance. Results are
available upon request.
13Most identifying variation comes from changes in state policy. Individuals who move across states with
and without Medicaid dental care coverage could contribute to this variation. This is very rare: 14.3 percent
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I estimate model (1.1) by using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS). In order
to conduct correct inference in the presence of serial correlation in the error term across
individuals within states over time, I compute standard errors clustered at the state level
(Wooldridge, 2002). This approach allows for arbitrary correlation within states over time.
Year dummy variables capture differences over time that affect the Medicaid population
(e.g. federal regulation). State dummy variables eliminate bias that may occur if time-
invariant state characteristics both lead states to provide Medicaid dental care coverage and
affect differences in the means of outcomes of interest between the Medicaid and non-
Medicaid populations. The use of state dummy variables means that identification of the
effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the use of dental care comes from changes
in coverage over time. Time-varying control variables help to account for state-specific
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity which may be correlated with changes in coverage.
State-specific yearly trends account for the possibility that trends in local economies and
health care markets (e.g. Medicaid enrollment) lead states to provide Medicaid dental care
coverage and affect differences in the means of outcomes of interest between the Medicaid
and non-Medicaid populations.
The parameter α1 measures the average difference in the outcome between adults in
states that provide Medicaid dental care coverage and adults in the states that do not pro-
vide Medicaid dental care coverage. Medicaid dental care coverage is defined as coverage
of at least some preventive, restorative, and extractive dental care. If states that do not
change Medicaid dental care coverage are valid counterfactuals for states that do, then the
estimated α1 should be close to zero and not statistically significant. The coefficient α2
controls for average differences between adults on Medicaid and the uninsured that are
unrelated to Medicaid dental care coverage. α3 measures the difference in the outcome
between adults on Medicaid and other adults in the states that change Medicaid dental care
coverage relative to the analogous difference in the states that do not change Medicaid
of the sample move across states, but only a few of them move between a state that provides Medicaid dental
care coverage and a state that did not.
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dental care coverage.
When the outcome variable is binary, I estimate model (1.1) by using linear probability
model (LPM). Over 99 percent of predicted values are between 0 and 1, so LPM model
with heteroskedastic standard errors generates marginal effects that are close to probit/
logit (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). This specification has the
advantage of not depending on the underlying data generating process (DGP)14. Still, as a
robustness check, I re-estimate the model using probit.
1.3.3 Identification
The identification assumption of model (1.1) is that, conditional on the included right-
hand side variables, there are no unobserved time-varying variables that correlate with the
difference in the use of care between adults on Medicaid and other adults. The biggest
threat to identification comes from changes in local economies. For instance, a weak econ-
omy with high unemployment may both increase Medicaid enrollment and strain state bud-
gets, thereby causing states to eliminate Medicaid dental care coverage. If newly eligible
adults have different dental needs than previously eligible adults on Medicaid, then the co-
efficient of interest may be biased. The direction of this bias is a priori unclear. Suppose
that states eliminate Medicaid dental care coverage, when Medicaid enrollment increases,
and this increase is correlated with young adults losing employment during the recession.
If newly eligible, young adults have better health and less need for dental care, then the
effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the use of care may be underestimated. At the
same time, elderly adults and adults with disabilities may be particularly affected by an
economic downturn, so that Medicaid enrollment for these two eligibility categories may
increase. If these adults have more dental problems compared to the existing pool of Med-
icaid patients and require more care, then the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on
14If the DGP follows a logistic distribution, then estimators that are based on other models (e.g.probit) are
inconsistent. Alternatively, if the DGP follows a normal distribution, then the logit functional form for the
parameter of interest is inconsistent.
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the use of care may be overestimated.
Time-varying control variables help to capture unobserved heterogeneity in local economies.
In addition, to the extent that not all the identifying variation comes from states that elimi-
nate Medicaid dental care coverage during the Great Recession, this problem is mitigated.
Still, I test for changes in Medicaid enrollment that may coincide with changes in Medicaid
dental care coverage. I exclude from the sample the states that added dental care coverage
between 2001 and 2011 and use the following specification:
Medicaidist = δ1Timet +δ2Full dental dropst +δ3Full dental dropstTimet + εist , (1.2)
where Timet is a linear time trend, and Full dental dropst takes on the value of 1 if
state s eliminates Medicaid dental care coverage between 2001 and 2011. The coefficient
δ2 measures the average difference in the level of the outcome variable between states
that eliminate Medicaid dental care coverage and states that do not change it; δ3 measures
whether the outcome variable changes at a different rate in the states that eliminate Medi-
caid dental care coverage as compared to states that do not change it.
The first column of Appendix Table 1.2 reports the results from model (1.2) for the
entire sample of adults. Fewer adults are covered by Medicaid over time: the coefficient on
Time is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. There is no evidence for differ-
ences in either levels or trends in the probability of Medicaid coverage between the states
that eliminate dental care coverage for adults on Medicaid and other states. In the next two
columns, I report the results separately for non-elderly non-disabled parents (column 2),
disabled adults (column 3), and elderly adults (column 4). Though the number of disabled
adults on Medicaid declines over time, there is no evidence for a differential trend in this
decline between states that eliminate Medicaid dental care coverage and those that do not
change it. These findings support my empirical strategy for using states that do not change
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Medicaid dental care coverage as counterfactuals for the states that do, since changes in
Medicaid dental care coverage are not significantly related to changes in program partici-
pation.
1.3.4 Results
The American Dental Association recommends at least one visit to the dentist office per
year, so the first question that I examine is the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on
the probability of the recommended yearly visit to the dentist office (Table 1.3). In the first
column, I allow the effects of Medicaid dental care coverage to vary across basic coverage
and full coverage. In the second column, I compare the effect of full coverage to basic or
no coverage. In the third column, I restrict the sample to adults whose income is below
200 percent of the federal poverty line. This comparison group is more appropriate as a
counterfactual for the experience of adults on Medicaid absent the policy change. I then
use this sample to estimate model (1) separately for parents (column 4) and disabled adults
(column 5).
The coefficient on Full dental captures changes over time in dental care use among
non-Medicaid adults, when Medicaid dental care coverage changes. The coefficient is not
statistically significant in columns 1-5. This finding validates my empirical strategy, as
it suggests that changes in Medicaid dental care coverage are not correlated with other
changes affecting the use of dental care among adults who are not covered by Medicaid.
In the first column, the coefficient on Medicaid dental care coverage is insignificant. This
finding indicates that adults on Medicaid obtain similar levels of dental care as other adults,
when Medicaid dental care coverage is not provided. The main coefficient of interest, the
interaction of Medicaid coverage and dental care coverage, captures the effect of Medicaid
dental coverage on the probability of going to the dentist office among adults on Medicaid.
The coefficient is positive and statistically significant for the interaction of Medicaid and
Full dental but not for the interaction of Medicaid and Basic dental. In columns 2-4 I
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therefore compare the effect of Medicaid full dental care coverage to basic or no coverage.
In columns 2-4, the coefficient on Medicaid is positive and statistically significant, sug-
gesting that even when full Medicaid dental coverage is not provided, adults on Medicaid
obtain more dental care than the uninsured. The estimate of 0.091 in column 2 implies
that Medicaid dental care coverage increases the probability of going to the dentist by
23 percent (=0.091/0.41). Though not large enough to raise the use of dental care up to
the recommended yearly visit to the dentist, this increase implies that over half of adults
on Medicaid obtain recommended treatment, when Medicaid dental care coverage is pro-
vided. The estimated effect of Medicaid dental care coverage becomes slightly larger, at
9.6 percentage points, when I exclude from the sample adults whose income is above 200
percent of FPL.15
The effect of Medicaid dental care coverage may vary by Medicaid eligibility category.
On the one side, the effect of dental coverage may be stronger among disabled adults who
face more problems with access to care, as compared to healthier non-elderly adults who
are parents to children on Medicaid.16 For example, some medication regimens reduce
saliva flow, a natural defense against cavity-causing bacteria. Certain chronic conditions
impair the ability to maintain proper nutrition and oral self-care, so disabled adults may
have greater need for dental care relative to other adults (GAO, 2000). Alternatively, if
dentist offices are not equipped to treat disabled adults, they may not be able to obtain
dental care, even if dental coverage is provided. In this case, the effect of Medicaid den-
tal coverage would be stronger among non-elderly adults who are parents to children on
Medicaid relative to disabled adults on Medicaid.
15As a robustness check, I re-estimate the model by using the probit model. In this model the marginal
effect of Medicaid dental care coverage is a function of the covariates: it is largest when the slope of the
CDF is largest (predicted probability close to 0.5). The marginal effect of a change in the interaction term is
not equal to the marginal effect of changing just the interaction term; the sign may be different for different
observations, and statistical significance cannot be determined from the z-statistic reported in the regression
output (Norton et al, 2004). I compute the true marginal effect by taking taking the cross derivative of the
expected value of the dependent variable. The resulting estimates are similar in magnitude to LPM estimates
(Appendix Table 1.3).
16About 20 percent of disabled adults on Medicaid report foregoing needed care; only 16 percent of parents
to children on Medicaid report foregoing needed dental care.
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I report the results separately for non-disabled non-elderly adults (‘parents’) (column 4
of Table 1.3), and disabled adults (column 5 of Table 1.3). Medicaid dental care coverage
causes larger increase in the probability of at least one dentist office visit per year among
disabled adults relative to parents in low-income families with dependent children. Though
this difference is not statistically significant (p-value: 0.18), this finding is consistent with
disabled adults experiencing greater need for dental care, and dental offices accommodating
adults with special needs.
An alternative measure of utilization is the number of visits to the dentist per year.
Basic Medicaid dental care coverage has at most small effect on the number of dentist
office visits among adults on Medicaid: the coefficient on the interaction term between
Medicaid and Basic dental is small in value and insignificant (column 1 of Table 1.4).17
In contrast, full Medicaid dental care coverage increases the number of visits to the dentist
by 0.22 (mean=0.90). The increase is similar in column 2, when I compare the effect of
full Medicaid dental care coverage to basic or no coverage. These findings suggest that,
in addition to allowing more adults on Medicaid to obtain dental care, Medicaid dental
care coverage enables them to obtain care more often. The estimated effect of Medicaid
dental coverage on the number of dental visits increases slightly to 23.7 percentage points,
when only adults below 200 percent of FPL are included in the sample. As before, the
increase in the number of visits is larger among disabled adults (column 5) relative to
parents of children on Medicaid (column 4), but the difference is not statistically significant
(p-value=0.51).
The results presented so far indicate that Medicaid dental care coverage increases the
use of care in dentist offices. One mechanism for this effect is the reduction in the effective
price of care. I provide more direct evidence for this mechanism by focusing on a measure
of foregone care due to financial reasons. Table 1.5 reports the results. In the preferred
17The outcome variable consists of a large number of zero values and non-negative integers ranging from
1 to 8. Modeling such data with a continuous distribution could lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. I
therefore use negative binomial distribution that yields consistent estimates in the presence of over-dispersion
(Wooldridge, 1999). Results remain unchanged, so I do not provide them here.
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specification in column 3, Medicaid dental care coverage causes a statistically significant
reduction in the probability of reporting unmet need for dental care of 6.3 percentage points
or 35 percent relative to the mean of 0.18. This finding confirms that the reduction in the
effective price of care drives the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the use of care.
1.3.5 Sensitivity Checks
As a robustness check, I examine the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the
probability of at least one visit to the doctor’s office. Large effects of Medicaid dental
care coverage on this outcome may complicate the causal interpretation of my results in
Tables 1.3- 1.5, as they suggest that changes in local economy or health care markets drive
both changes in Medicaid dental care coverage and changes in utilization of dental care.
Appendix Table 1.4 reports the results. The coefficient on Full dental is small and sta-
tistically insignificant, suggesting that changes in Medicaid dental care coverage are not
correlated with other changes affecting the use of dental care among non-Medicaid benefi-
ciaries. The coefficient on Medicaid is positive, indicating that Medicaid beneficiaries are
more likely to go to the doctor’s office at least once a year relative to uninsured adults. The
coefficient of interest, the interaction between Medicaid Full dental is small and statisti-
cally insignificant. It is positive, suggesting that Medicaid dental care coverage may lead
to small increases in the use of medical care, perhaps because dentists remind their patients
to obtain yearly medical check-ups.
Model (1.1) assumes that the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the use of care
is constant over time. Adults may not react to changes in coverage immediately, so its ef-
fect on the use of care may not become apparent until a few years after the policy change.
A number of states eliminated Medicaid dental care coverage at the time that is not covered
by the SIPP data (Figure 1.2 and Table 1.2), so I am not able to obtain a precise estimate for
the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage in the first years of its implementation. Still, I
test for dynamic effects of Medicaid dental care coverage by eliminating from the sample
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the year of implementation and re-estimating model (1.1). If Medicaid dental care cover-
age has larger effects in the medium run than in the short run, then the newly estimated
coefficient on the interaction term between Medicaid and Full dental should be smaller
in magnitude than that from Table 1.3. Consistent with this hypothesis, the estimated co-
efficient increases to 0.10 (column 1 of Appendix Table 1.5). I further restrict the sample
to individuals in years for which their state of residence either added or did not change
Medicaid dental care coverage (column 2), and allow the effect of Medicaid dental care
coverage to vary in the first three years after the policy change (column 3). The estimated
effect of Medicaid dental care coverage increases significantly in the third year after the
introduction of Medicaid dental coverage. These findings suggest that it takes a few years
for adults to learn about dental care coverage; after this adjustment period, more adults go
to dentist offices on a yearly basis.
1.4 Offset Effect of Medicaid Dental Care Coverage
Results so far indicate that, by reducing the effective price of care, Medicaid dental
care coverage increases the use of care in dentist offices. Adults on Medicaid always have
access to basic dental care in hospital emergency departments. If preventive care and urgent
care are substitutes, then greater use of care in dentist offices may lower the use of care in
hospital emergency departments. I estimate this offset effect by focusing on California that
eliminated dental care coverage for adults on Medicaid on July 1, 2009.
1.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I estimate the offset effect of Medicaid dental care coverage by using discharge data
for all patients in hospital emergency departments in California between 2005 and 2011
from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Emergency Department
Databases (SEDD). For each ED patient, I observe basic demographics (gender, age, race),
primary diagnosis, 20 other diagnoses, and primary payer (Medicare, Medicaid, private, or
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uninsured)18. The sample is based on over 30 million ED visits for adults above the age of
21.
Few adults go to hospital ED to treat dental disease: only 1.37 percent of ED patients
have dental disease as the primary diagnosis (Table 1.6). Dental disease is any disease of
oral cavity, salivary glands, and jaws, as defined by the International Classification of Dis-
eases (ICD-9) (Appendix Table 1.6). Most adults could avoid an ED visit for dental care if
they had gone to the dentist office: 1.11 percent of ED patients have preventable dental dis-
ease as the primary diagnosis. Preventable dental disease is dental disease that could have
been prevented at an earlier time. Appendix Table 1.7 provides a list of preventable dental
diseases. Some dental disease may not be identified correctly, since hospital emergency
departments do not commonly employ dentists. I address this problem by using a broader
definition of dental disease that includes dental disease, as well as cellulitis (infection) and
abscess (inflammation) of the face that could originate from dental disease; 1.93 percent of
ED patients have this type of disease as primary diagnosis. Appendix Table 1.8 provides
detailed comparisons between HCUP SEDD and other sources.
The main outcome of interest is the number of ED visits for dental disease per popula-
tion. I construct this outcome by collapsing hospital discharge data to the level of insurance
type, county, and month, and dividing the number of ED visits for dental disease by county
population (in 1,000’s). There is no discontinuity in the outcome around the time of the
policy change (Figure 1.3). This observation provides descriptive evidence that Medicaid
dental care coverage is not associated with changes in the number of ED visits for dental
disease per population.
County-level time-varying control variables help to account for changes that may affect
both Medicaid dental care coverage and the use of care among adults on Medicaid. I
control for changes in recessionary pressures by using unemployment rate in each county
18Medicare includes both fee-for-service and managed care Medicare patients. Medicaid includes both fee-
for-service and managed care Medicaid patients. Private insurance includes Blue Cross, commercial carriers,
and private HMOs and PPOs. There is no information on secondary payer.
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and month, as well as employment rate in 14 largest 2-digit NAICS industries. These data
come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Because dental health depends on the
availability of dentists, I control for the number of dentists per 1,000 residents in each year
and state using information from the American Dental Association (ADA). Individuals who
cannot obtain care in dentist offices may go to community health centers (CHC), so I control
for the number of CHC in each state and year. This information comes from the National
Association of Community Health Centers. Estimates for California population by year,
county, age, race, and sex come from the California Department of Finance. The number
of Medicaid beneficiaries by county, year, and age comes from the California Department
of Health Care Services. The number of uninsured adults in each county and year comes
from the U.S. Census Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE).
1.4.2 Empirical Strategy
Ideally, I would observe whether each adult in California goes to the ED for dental
disease. These data are not available, so my strategy is to compare the number of ED visits
for dental disease per county population between adults on Medicaid and other adults.
Simple comparisons of the change in the outcome between adults on Medicaid and other
adults may mask differential trends in the use of care across the two populations. I therefore
adopt an event-study model:
Yhct = γ1
84
∑
j=1
M j+ γ2
84
∑
j=1
MedicaidhctM j+ γ3Xhct + εhct , (1.3)
where each M j=1 in the jth month to/from eliminating Medicaid dental care coverage
(the omitted month is the month of implementation, j = 55), and Medicaidhct=1 for adults
who are covered by Medicaid. Xhct includes county fixed effects, and time-varying county
characteristics: number of dentists per 1,000 county resident, number of community health
clinics per 1,000 county resident, fraction of population by race (black, American Indian,
Asian, Pacific Indian, Hispanic, multi-race), fraction of female population, and fraction of
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employment in 14 major 2-digit NAICS industries, and unemployment rate.
Time-varying control variables help to account for county-specific shocks that may
drive ED use for dental care. For example, greater number of dentists per capita may
allow adults to obtain dental care outside of the ED; job loss may cause individuals to lose
their dental insurance, thereby increasing their reliance on ED care for dental disease. The
coefficients γ1’s represent the time path for dental care use relative to the month of the
policy change, and γ2’s capture the difference in the outcome between adults on Medicaid
and other adults in each month relative to the month of the policy change. If eliminating
Medicaid dental care coverage induces greater reliance on dental care in the ED, then γ2
should become positive and statistically after June 2009.
In an alternative specification, I re-estimate the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage
in California on the outcome of interest by using a DID model. I regress the outcome on
the indicator for Medicaid coverage, Medicaid, indicator for the period when no Medicaid
dental care coverage is provided, PostJune′09, the interaction between the PostJune′09
and Medicaid, and a full set of control variables (county fixed effects, indicator variables
for each month, and time-varying county characteristics: number of dentists per 1,000
county resident, number of community health clinics per 1,000 county resident, fraction of
population by race (black, American Indian, Asian, Pacific Indian, Hispanic, multi-race),
fraction of female population, and fraction of employment in 14 major 2-digit NAICS
industries, and unemployment rate).
The standard DID framework assumes no differential trend between adults on Medicaid
and other adults in the pre-event period. I test this parallel trend assumption by restricting
the sample to the period before July 2009 and regressing the outcome on the indicator for
Medicaid coverage, month-year time trend, Medicaid-specific month-year time trend, and
a full set of control variables. The coefficient on Medicaid-specific time trend is positive
in magnitude and weakly statistically significant (p-value=0.057), suggesting that adults on
Medicaid use more dental care in ED over time relative to other adults. In the preferred
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specification that restricts the sample to 2008-2011, however, there is no evidence that
the outcome grows at a different rate between adults on Medicaid and other adults (p-
value=0.639). This observation validates my empirical strategy of measuring the impact of
Medicaid dental care coverage by comparing the difference in the use of care among adults
on Medicaid before and after the policy change to the analogous difference in the outcome
among non-Medicaid adults.
1.4.3 Results
Figure 1.4 plots the estimated γ2 coefficients from model (1.3) that capture the differ-
ence in the outcome between adults on Medicaid and other adults relative to the month
of the policy change. Dashed lined represent 95 percent confidence intervals for each
coefficient. The outcome is the number of ED visits for preventable dental disease per
1,000 county residents. There is no evidence for differential trends in the outcome between
adults on Medicaid and other adults (p-value: 0.80). This finding validates my use of non-
Medicaid adults as a control group for adults on Medicaid, as it suggests that both groups
experienced similar trends in the use of ED care prior to the policy change. I fail to reject
that adults on Medicaid used similar levels of ED care for dental disease before and after
the policy change (p-value: 0.87). This finding suggests that Medicaid dental care coverage
does not increase the probability of going to the ED for dental care.
The event-study framework measures the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage rel-
ative to the period of the policy change. As an alternative, I estimate its effect by using
a DID model. Column 1 of Table 1.8 reports the estimates without controlling for time-
varying and time-invariant county characteristics, column 2 restricts the sample to 2008-
2011, and column 3 adds full control variables to the restricted sample. After controlling
for time-invariant differences across counties and time-varying changes in local economies
and health care markets, the coefficient on PostJune′09 is not significant. Consistent with
the causal interpretation of the results, this finding suggests that Medicaid dental care cov-
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erage has no effect on the outcome for adults who are not covered by Medicaid. Even when
Medicaid does not cover dental care, adults on Medicaid go to the ED for dental care more
often than other adults: the coefficient on Medicaid is positive and statistically significant,
perhaps because Medicaid beneficiaries always have access to basic dental care for the
relief of pain, infection or trauma. The coefficient on the interaction of PostJune′09 and
Medicaid is small in value and statistically insignificant, indicating that Medicaid dental
care coverage does not a have large effect on the use of dental care in hospital ED. The
largest offset effect that I cannot reject with 95 percent confidence is a 0.16 percentage
point increase in the number of ED visits for dental disease per 1,000 county residents.
Comparing the use of care between adults on Medicaid and other adults could be prob-
lematic, if people lose private insurance coverage over time. Elderly adults on Medicaid
are similar to Medicare beneficiaries, while parents of children on Medicaid are similar to
non-elderly uninsured adults. To establish more adequate comparisons, I estimate the offset
effects of Medicaid dental care coverage separately for each category of adults. Column 1
of Appendix Table 1.9 restricts the sample to adults above 65 years of age who are covered
either by Medicaid or Medicare. In this specification, elderly adults on Medicaid are com-
pared to elderly adults on Medicare who are not dual eligibles. In column 2, I restrict the
sample to non-elderly adults who are either uninsured or covered by Medicaid. In column
3, I compare non-elderly adults on Medicaid to children on Medicaid who are unaffected
by the policy change. Across the three specifications, there is no evidence that Medicaid
dental care coverage affects the number of ED visits for dental disease among the control
groups: the estimated coefficients on PostJune′09 are small in magnitude and statistically
insignificant. Similar to the results from Table 1.8, the coefficient of interest, the interaction
between PostJune′09 and Medicaid, is small and statistically insignificant. These findings
provide additional evidence that offset effects of Medicaid dental care coverage are at most
small.
Prior studies estimate offset effects of Medicaid dental care coverage by comparing
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the probability of dental disease among hospital ED patients before and after the policy
change. This approach does not account for changes in the composition of the Medicaid
program that could lead to spurious relationship between Medicaid dental care coverage
and the probability of dental disease among ED patients on Medicaid. For example, states
may eliminate Medicaid dental care coverage during periods of recession. If healthier
adults become eligible for Medicaid during economic downturns, then average probability
of ED visit could decrease for adults on Medicaid relative to non-Medicaid adults. The
same change in the composition of the Medicaid program could lead to an increase in the
probability of dental disease among ED patients on Medicaid relative to non-Medicaid ED
patients. As a result of these two offsetting effects, the probability of ED dental disease
could remain unchanged.
To investigate whether differences in data or methodology drive differences between
my results and Wallace et al (2011) and Cohen et al (2002), I estimate a DID model for the
probability of dental disease among ED patients (Table 1.9).19 To make the results compa-
rable to prior studies, I use as the unit of observation individual and month. The coefficient
on Full dental is not significant, suggesting that Medicaid dental care coverage does not
affect the probability of dental disease among non-Medicaid ED patients. The coefficient
on Medicaid is positive and statistically significant, indicating that ED patients on Med-
icaid are more likely to be diagnosed with dental disease than other patients. The main
coefficient of interest of -0.3 percentage points implies that Medicaid dental care coverage
lowers the probability of dental disease in ED among adults on Medicaid from 0.020 to
0.017. This small reduction in the outcome is similar to estimates from Oregon (Wallace
et al, 2012) and Maryland (Cohen et al, 2002). In summary, my results are similar to the
previous studies, when I use the same methodology, suggesting that changes in program
participation, local economy, or health care markets may lead to a spurious association
19The outcome variable is binary with large number of zero values, so linear probability model may not be
appropriate. Re-estimating it with probit and computing marginal effect of the interaction terms using the the
approach from Norton et al (2004) yields similar results (Appendix Table 1.10).
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between Medicaid dental care coverage and ED use for dental disease.
1.5 Effect of Medicaid Dental Care Coverage on the Number of Bed
Days
Prior studies suggest that adults in the US missed more than 20 million workhours due
to dental disease (GAO, 2000). This estimate is based on data from the National Health
Interview Survey (1989) that includes questions about the number of bed days20 and the
number of work-loss days21 for specific diseases among adults in the US. Average number
of bed days in 1989 was 3.44 (UDHHS, 1990). This is significantly lower than the average
number of bed days in the 2001-2013 SIPP data of 13.86. Average number of work-loss
days of 3.37 per person in the NHIS data in 1989, however, is comparable to the average
number of bed days of 3.26 among adults in the SIPP data. The number of bed days for
dental disease is low in the NHIS data, at 0.018 days per employed adult. Unmet need for
dental care grew from 11 percent to 17 percent between 1997 and 2009 (NCHS, 2011).
Assuming that the number of work loss due to dental problems reflects unmet need for
dental care, an average adult in the US in 2009 loses about 0.044 days due to dental disease.
I cannot measure work-loss days directly, but I can observe the number of bed days
among employed adults in the sample. Table 1.10 reports the results. Column 1 reports
the results for the full sample of adults, column 2 restricts the sample to only adults with
income below 200 percent of the FPL. Column 3 further restricts the sample to employed
adults for whom the number of bed days may provide a lower bound for the number of
sick days at work. Across all three columns, the coefficient on Full dental is insignificant,
suggesting that changes in Medicaid dental care coverage are not correlated with other
changes affecting the number of bed days taken by adults who are not covered by Medicaid.
20Both NHIS and SIPP define a bed day as a day during which a person stayed in bed more than half a day
because of illness or injury.
21A work-loss days is one on which a currently employed person 18 years of age and over missed more
than half a day from a job or business.
25
The coefficient on Medicaid is positive and statistically significant, indicating that adults on
Medicaid take more bed days relative to adults who are not covered by Medicaid. Medicaid
dental care coverage reduces the number of bed days by 1.751, when all adults are used for
comparison.22 Poor adults who are not on Medicaid provide a better counterfactual for the
experience of adults on Medicaid than other adults in the US. When the sample is restricted
to poor adults, the estimate declines to 1.406 days or 9.7 percent relative to the mean of
14.44 (column 2). It further declines to 0.281, when I create an even more homogenous
sample of only parents to children on Medicaid and parents to children who are not on
Medicaid (column 3).
One aspect of the value of better health is improved productivity and earnings through
reductions in absenteeism. A reduction in the number of bed days among employed adults
is one measure of absenteeism. In the preferred specification in column 6, Medicaid dental
care coverage reduces the number of bed days among employed adults on Medicaid by
0.131 or 4 percent relative to the mean of 3.24. Large confidence interval around this
estimate, however, implies that the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the number
of bed days among employed adults on Medicaid may vary between a reduction of 0.566(=-
0.131-(1.96*0.222)) and an increase of 0.304(=-0.131+(1.96*0.222)).
Any effect on bed days comes from adults whose use of dental care is reduced when
Medicaid dental care coverage is eliminated. A 9 percentage point increase in the probabil-
ity of at least one dentist visit in a year due to Medicaid dental care coverage (Table 1.3)23
implies that the average reduction in bed days of 0.131 is equivalent to a reduction of 1.42
bed days among employed adults on Medicaid who increased their use of dental care.
22The outcome variable consists of a large number of zero values and non-negative integers ranging from
1 to 30. Modeling such data with a continuous distribution could lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. I
therefore use negative binomial distribution that yields consistent estimates in the presence of over-dispersion
(Wooldridge, 1999). Results remain unchanged, so I do not provide them here.
23Medicaid dental care coverage increases the probability of at least one dental visit by 9.22 percentage
points points among employed adults on Medicaid relative to poor adults who are not on Medicaid. Results
are not reported here.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the use of care
and costs. By reducing the effective price of care, Medicaid dental care coverage leads to
a substantial increase in the probability of a recommended yearly visit to dentist offices.
I find no offset effect of Medicaid dental care coverage related to ED visits. Differences
in methodology – rather than data – drive observed differences between my results and
previous estimates of offset effect of Medicaid dental care coverage. I document substantial
changes in the number of bed days in response to changes in Medicaid dental care coverage.
This finding suggests the need to account for changes in health and productivity in order to
estimate broader impacts of insurance.
Dental care is not included in the Affordable Care Act as an ‘essential benefit’ that
must be covered by health plans participating in health insurance exchanges. Increased
enrollment in Medicaid will create additional fiscal pressure for those states that currently
cover dental care for adults on Medicaid. My findings indicate that, on the one hand, states
can substantially reduce short-term Medicaid costs by eliminating dental care coverage, as
offset effects through increased ED visits are minimal. On the other hand, based on the
results on the number of bed days, this elimination would be expected to have important
effects on productivity and health.
Estimating the value of prevention has broader implications for the health care reform.
The results of this paper suggest that access to preventive care due to the Affordable Care
Act will not reduce the use of emergency care. As a result, medical costs will increase.
Changes in insurance coverage will have implications for businesses and local economies.
For example, reduced absenteeism among working adults will raise firm productivity and
increase government budgets through higher tax revenue.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Medicaid dental care coverage across states over time
Coverage refers to full dental care coverage for adults on Medicaid. Adults are defined as individuals over
21 years of age. Information provided in this chart concerns the main Medicaid program, and does not ad-
dress dental care coverage in Medicaid participating nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities, pregnancy-
related services programs for adults, or other Medicaid program components.
Sources: American Dental Association, GAO survey of state Medicaid and SCHIP agencies from Jan. 2000,
and various press releases
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Figure 1.2: Percentage of adults on Medicaid with dental care coverage over time
Percentage of adults on Medicaid with dental care coverage is constructed by dividing the number of Medi-
caid beneficiaries with dental care coverage in a given year by the number of Medicaid beneficiaries in that
year. Adults are defined as individuals over 21 years of age. Dental care coverage is defined as 1 if the state
provides ‘full coverage:’ covers some diagnostic, preventive and restorative treatment; it takes on the value of
0 is the state provides no coverage or covers only basic dental care for the relief of pain, infection, or trauma.
Sources: American Dental Association (ADA), various press releases, and Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS)
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Figure 1.3: Offset effects for Medicaid dental care coverage: evidence from California
Figure plots the number of ED visits for preventable dental disease per population (in 1,000’s).
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Figure 1.4:
The effect of Medicaid dental care coverage in California on the number of ED
visits for dental disease
I estimate an event study model by collapsing ED discharge data to the level of county, month, and insurance
category (Medicaid vs. non-Medicaid). The resulting sample has 9,235 observations from 55 counties in
California. I use as outcome the number of ED visits for dental disease in each insurance category per county
population (in 1,000’s). I construct a variable that measures time difference in month to the policy change.
This ‘event time’ ranges from -54 to 29. I estimate the event study model by regressing the outcome on the
event time indicator variables, interactions between Medicaid coverage and each event time, county fixed
effects, and time-varying county characteristics: number of dentists per 1,000 county resident, number of
community health clinics per 1,000 county resident, fraction of population by race (black, American Indian,
Asian, Pacific Indian, Hispanic, multi-race), fraction of female population, fraction of employment in 14
major 2-digit NAICS industries, and unemployment rate.
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Table 1.2: Key covariates and outcomes from SIPP
Non-Medicaid Adults on Medicaid
Adults Parents Other
Employed 68.40% 59.70% 18.24%
Private coverage 78.14%
Medicare coverage 20.42% 1.09% 45.43%
Family income $65,486 $30,228 $26,807
Below poverty line1 9.02% 45.47% 36.70%
≥1 visit to the dentist2 61.11% 46.12% 39.15%
Number of dentist office visits2 1.32 0.92 0.89
Did not see a dentist when needed3 8.56% 15.96% 16.01%
Number of bed days2 3.81 3.47 17.93
Share of adults w/ ≥1 bed days2 0.58 0.61 0.69
Number of visits to the doctor2 0.78 0.77 0.89
Did not see a doctor when needed3 0.07 0.10 0.12
Number of children’s dentist visits2 0.64 0.58 0.61
1Below poverty=1 for all adults whose family income is below the poverty threshold for this family. 2This
variable comes from Medical Expenses and Utilization Module, so it is defined for 66% of 627,984 adults in
the sample. 3This variable comes from Adult Well-Being module, so it is defined for 34% of 627,984 adults
in the sample. The sample includes only adults above the age of 21. Unit of observation is individual and year.
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Table 1.6: Hospital emergency department use for dental disease in California
Disease type %ED admissions
Dental diseases 1.37
Preventable dental diseases 1.11
Dental diseases, broad def’n 1.92
Injuries 19.19
Abdominal pain 10.22
Musculoskeletal system diseases 7.88
Respiratory system diseases 7.59
Genitourinary system diseases 6.26
Nervous system diseases 5.23
Mental diseases 4.52
Diseases of the skin 4.11
Circulatory system diseases 3.44
Endocrine metabolic and immunity diseases 2.04
Infectious and parasitic diseases 1.42
Dental disease includes diseases of teeth (e.g. cavities), supporting structures (e.g. gums), jaws (e.g.
inflammations), salivary glands (e.g. abscess). This variable takes on the value of 1 if each ED patient
has dental disease as primary diagnosis and 0 if each ED patient has other disease as primary diagnosis.
Preventable dental disease is dental disease that could have been prevented at an earlier time. Broader
definition of dental diagnoses includes dental disease, cellulitis, and abscess of face that could originate
from dental diseases. Injuries include fractures, dislocations, sprains and strains, open woods and burns.
Abdominal pain includes diseases of esophagus or stomach, gernia and appendicitis. Musculoskeletal
diagnoses (of locomotor system) include arthropathies (diseases of joint), dorsopathies (diseases of back
or spine). Respiratory system diseases include acute common cold, sinusitis, and tonsillitis. Genitourinary
system diseases are nephritis (inflammation of kidney), nephrosis (non-inflammatory kidney disease),
diseases of urinary system, diseases of male genital organs, disorders of breast, inflammations of female
pelvic organs and other disorders of female genital tract. Nervous system diseases are inflammations of
central nervous system (e.g. meningitis), sleep disorders, diseases of peripheral nervous system, disorders or
eye, or year. Mental diseases are psychoses, mental retardation and other mental disorders. Diseases of skin
are infections and inflammations of skin. Circulatory system diseases include hypertension, heart disease,
and chest pain. Endocrine metabolic and immunity diseases are diseases of thyroid gland, endocrine gland,
nutritional deficiencies, and metabolic and immunity disorders. Infectious and parasitic diseases include
intestinal infectious diseases, and bacterial diseases. Each variable takes on value of 1 if primary diagnosis
on each discharge reflects respective disease.
Unit of observation is individual and month. N=30 million.
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Table 1.7:
Descriptive evidence for the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the num-
ber of ED visits for preventable dental disease per county population (in 1,000s)
No Medicaid dental cov. Medicaid dental cov.
Non-Medicaid 0.28 0.33
Medicaid 1.30 1.47
The unit of observation is county, month, and insurance type. N=9,235.
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Table 1.8:
Effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the number of hospital ED visits for
preventable dental disease
Num. of ED visit for dental disease
(1) (2) (3)
Post-June’09 0.059*** 0.032*** 0.003
(0.011) (0.010) (0.048)
Medicaid 1.029*** 1.113*** 1.113***
(0.144) (0.158) (0.158)
Post-June’09*Medicaid 0.112* 0.028 0.028
(0.067) (0.052) (0.052)
N 9,235 5,280 5,280
R2 0.562 0.595 0.599
Controls No No Yes
2005, 2006, 2007? Yes No No
Mean of dep. var, Medicaid
1.30 1.40 1.40
adults before July’09
I estimate the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage in California on the number of hospital ED visit for
preventable dental disease per population (in 1,000’s).
Each column represents a separate regression of the outcome on Medicaid coverage indicator, indicator for
Medicaid dental care coverage (PostJune′09=1 after June 2009), and interaction between Medicaid dental
care coverage and Medicaid coverage. Some specifications include control variables for county fixed effects,
indicator variables for each month, and time-varying county characteristics: number of dentists per 1,000
county resident, number of community health clinics per 1,000 county resident, fraction of population by
race (black, American Indian, Asian, Pacific Indian, Hispanic, multi-race), fraction of female population,
and fraction of employment in 14 major 2-digit NAICS industries, and unemployment rate.
Unit of observation is county, insurance type, and month.
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Table 1.9:
Effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on preventable dental disease among
ED patients
Prob. of dental disease among ED patients
(1) (2) (3)
Post-June’09 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Medicaid 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post-June’09*Medicaid 0.002** 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 9,235 5,280 5,280
R2 0.253 0.270 0.494
Controls No No Yes
2005, 2006, 2007? Yes No No
Mean of dep. var, Medicaid
0.039 0.040 0.040
adults before July’09
The outcome variable takes on the value of 1 if each ED patient is diagnosed with preventable dental disease
and 0 if each ED patient is diagnosed with non-dental disease. This outcome is therefore interpreted as the
probability of having dental disease among ED patients.
Regression in column 3 includes county fixed effects, indicator variables for each month, indicator
variables for gender, race, and age category, and time-varying county characteristics: number of dentists
per capita, number of CHC per capita, fraction of employment in 14 major 2-digit NAICS industries,
and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are clusters in parentheses at county-event level. Unit of
observation is individual, county and month.
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CHAPTER II
Do Health Care Providers Respond to Increased
Reimbursement Rates?
Evidence from Healthy Kids Dental
Over the past two decades there has been a dramatic increase in the number of children
covered by public health insurance. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
expands public insurance to include adults with family incomes up to 138 percent of the
Federal Poverty Level. While a fundamental goal of expanding public insurance cover-
age is to improve access to health care among low income families, this will only occur
if there is a sufficient supply of health care providers willing to treat publicly insured pa-
tients. Historically, low Medicaid reimbursement rates have limited provider participation,
leading to access problems in many communities. For this reason, the ACA legislation not
only expands eligibility for public coverage but also provides funding to increase Medicaid
reimbursement rates for primary care. To understand the potential impact of this element
of the reforms, it is important to understand how reimbursement rates affect the supply of
services to Medicaid patients.
Sloan et al (1978) develop a model of a provider’s decision to accept Medicaid patients.
Assuming that the provider faces a downward sloping demand curve in the private market,
is a price taker with respect to Medicaid patients and that the cost of providing care is
45
the same for all patients, the optimal allocation will be one where the marginal revenue
from private patients equals the fixed Medicaid payment rate and the provider’s marginal
cost. A main prediction of this model is that when Medicaid rates rise relative to private
market fees, a greater number of providers treat public patients; those providers who treat
a mix of public and private patients start treat more public patients. Using data from a
national survey of private practice physicians, the authors find results that are consistent
with this prediction. They estimate an elasticity of Medicaid participation with respect to
fees of roughly 0.2. Higher private fees discourage physician involvement in Medicaid,
suggesting that insurance programs compete with one another for physician time.
Greater provider participation may not necessarily increase the use of care. For ex-
ample, Baker and Royalty (2000) find that public insurance expansions in the 1980s and
1990s led to increased participation of providers in public setting but not providers in pri-
vate settings. These results suggest that increases in Medicaid rates merely shifted Medi-
caid patients from public sector physicians to ones in private practice. Similarly, Gruber et
al (1997) find that an increase in Medicaid fees in Tennessee moved patients from outpa-
tient clinics to physician offices. In general, whether higher Medicaid payments translate to
greater use of care among Medicaid patients depends on the availability of other sources of
care. If patients on Medicaid receive care in public settings when Medicaid reimbursement
rates are low, then raising the rates may shift the site of care from those clinics to private
practices. If, on the other hand, publicly insured patients do not have access to care in
public settings, then the increase in reimbursement rates may increase the use of care.
In the context of dental care, low reimbursement rates are commonly cited as a primary
reason that children in low-income families have poor access to care and high rates of tooth
decay (GAO 2000). Buchmueller et al (2013) use survey data from Medicaid patients and
dental providers across states to show that increased reimbursement rates in the last decade
have caused a small increase in provider participation and, hence, on the use of dental care.
The study exploits small increases in reimbursement rates to providers. For example, the
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Medicaid reimbursement rate for periodic oral exam, one of the most common dental pro-
cedures, declines from 62 to 54 percent of private fees, while the Medicaid reimbursement
rate for a comprehensive oral exam fell from 50 to 46 percent of private fees. It therefore re-
mains unclear whether provider participation would increase more dramatically with larger
increases in reimbursement rates.
This paper examines whether, by increasing provider participation, higher reimburse-
ment rates cause an increase in the use of dental care. I exploit recent changes in insurance
coverage due to Healthy Kids Dental (HKD), an innovative program in Michigan aimed at
improving access to dental care by increasing the willingness of dental providers to treat
children on Medicaid. The key feature of the program is that the state contracts with a
private insurer, Delta Dental, to provide dental coverage to children in selected counties.
Delta then reimburses providers according to the same fee schedule used for its commer-
cially insured groups. Though reimbursement rates vary by procedure, commercial fees are
much larger than Medicaid fees: the median reimbursement per procedure increases from
$24 to $42 when the program goes into effect. Providers serving children on Medicaid in
counties where HKD is not implemented continue to be reimbursed through Medicaid.
Prior evidence suggests that the original expansion phase of the program to some of
Michigan’s counties improved access to dental care. Eklund et al (2003) exploit the in-
crease in reimbursement due to the introduction of HKD to 22 counties in May 2000.
These counties make up 14 percent of Michigan’s population. The authors find that within
the first 12 months increases in reimbursement rates are positively correlated with increases
in the number of dentists accepting Medicaid and the use of dental care among patients on
Medicaid. This result suggests that increasing reimbursement rates may be an effective
way of raising the use of care. The original expansion counties were very rural, however,
so the results may not generalize to counties where dentists have higher opportunity costs
of treating patients on Medicaid.
My analysis focuses on the expansion of the program to two more counties in 2008.
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These ‘transition’08’ counties make up about 6 percent of Michigan’s population. I also
rely on data from four additional counties that joined the program in 2012. These ‘transi-
tion’12’ counties make up about 3 percent of Michigan’s population. I use a difference-in-
difference strategy and an event-study framework to identify the effect of increased reim-
bursement rates on provider participation and the use of dental care. Because I condition on
county fixed effects, my estimates are identified by within-county variation in reimburse-
ment rates. This approach mitigates the bias that might result from a correlation between
changes in reimbursement rates and other county-level factors that influence provider par-
ticipation and the use of dental care.
Detailed claims data from the Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH)
for January 2007 to June 2012 allow me to precisely measure the temporal association be-
tween increased reimbursement rates to providers and provider participation. I measure
provider participation using the number of dentists participating in Medicaid and the num-
ber of children on Medicaid per dentist. I further test whether higher provider participation
increases the use of dental care. The American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry (AAPD)
recommends that children visit dental providers at least every six months (AAPD, 2009).
Focusing on the number of children with at least one dental visit therefore allows me to
examine the extent to which increased reimbursement rates improve the level of care up to
the recommended levels. An alternative measure for the use of dental care is the number of
dental visits by children on Medicaid.
I find that dentists serving children on Medicaid in transition’08 counties respond to
increased reimbursement rates by seeing more patients on Medicaid: the number of den-
tists participating in Medicaid per county and six-month period increases by 36.1 percent
on average (mean number of dentists per county and six-month period=199). The number
of children on Medicaid per dentist, however, remains unchanged. This observation may
suggest that greater participation of dentists treating fewer children on Medicaid comes at
the expense of declines in participation of dentists treating large volumes of children on
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Medicaid. In line with this hypothesis, increased reimbursement rates lead to very small
increases in the share of children on Medicaid with any dental care of about 3 percent
(mean share of children on Medicaid with any dental care per county and six-month pe-
riod=0.265). A similar increase is observed in the number of dental visits per child enrolled
in Medicaid. I find little evidence that increased reimbursement rates affect enrollment in
Medicaid, suggesting that the above effects are driven by increased use of dental care.
Substantial increase in provider participation and smaller increase in the use of dental
care are consistent with a shift in the source of care away from public providers (e.g. public
clinics and hospital clinics) to private providers. Consistent with this hypothesis, prior
studies found that public insurance expansions led to increased participation of providers
in public setting but not providers in private settings. In particular, Baker and Royalty
(2000) examine physician response to Medicaid eligibility expansions for pregnant women
on Medicaid. They find that the expansions increased the percentage of patients who are
poor or on Medicaid among physicians in public settings, but not among physicians in
private practices.
If increased reimbursement rates are evaluated based on their ability to increase the use
of dental care up to the recommended levels, then even the large increases implemented in
Michigan fall short of achieving this goal. Higher reimbursement rates may, however, have
other advantages. For example, by increasing provider participation in Medicaid, they may
allow Medicaid patients to find providers that better suit their needs (e.g. providers who
are located closer to their homes).
2.1 Background
The Healthy Kids Dental program was introduced gradually over time. Table 2.1 sum-
marizes the roll-out of the program and Figure 2.1 provides a map for its implementation
across Michigan’s counties. The program was originally implemented in 2000 in 37 of
Michigan’s 83 counties; 22 more counties were added in 2006. In the period prior to the in-
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crease in reimbursement rates (January 2007 to June 2008) these ‘old HKD’ counties have a
higher unemployment rate than most other counties (Table 2.2). The old HKD counties are
more rural and have fewer dentists per capita than other counties in Michigan. In parts of
the analysis, these counties are used as counterfactuals for the experience of counties that
transition to increased reimbursement during the time frame for the analysis, ‘transition
counties’.
In 2008, the program was rolled out in two more counties: Saginaw and Genesee.
Like the old HKD counties, these ‘transition 2008 counties’ have a high unemployment
rate in the period before reimbursement rates are increased. They are more urban than the
rest of Michigan and have a greater number of dentists per population than either the old
HKD counties or the non-HKD counties. The program was further expanded to four more
counties (Mason, Muskegon, Newaygo, and Oceana) on February 1, 2012. I refer to these
counties as ‘transition 2012 counties.’ These counties are more rural than the counties that
transitioned to HKD in 2008.
The counties where dentists are still paid according to the Medicaid fee schedule, ‘non-
HKD counties,’ are located in the southern part of the state.1 These counties are similar to
transition 2008 counties when it comes to unemployment, the number of dentists per capita
and rurality. They constitute another comparison group for the transition counties.
Children are enrolled in the program based on their county of residence. All chil-
dren enrolled in Medicaid under 21 are enrolled into the program automatically. Each
enrolled child receives a letter in the mail with instructions on how to contact Delta Dental
for assistance in finding a participating dentist in their area. Dentists also receive a let-
ter outlining participation requirements, counties included, plans offered in each county,
and other administrative information.2 As with traditional Medicaid, HKD covers a com-
1The program was expanded to 10 counties on October 1, 2012 and 3 more counties on October 1, 2013.
Since these last transitions take place after the end my data period, they are among the set of non-HKD
counties for the whole duration of my analysis.
2Dentists who do not contract with Delta Dental cannot get reimbursed for treating children in HKD
counties. Over 93 percent of Michigan’s dentists contract with Delta Dental.
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prehensive range of diagnostic, preventive and restorative dental services with no required
out-of-pocket costs.
The distinguishing feature of the program is that from the provider’s perspective HKD
is identical to commercial insurance coverage through Delta Dental: Delta pays dentists
using the same policies and procedures, claim submission, and reimbursement methods
as with its other commercial dental contracts. I calculate that the median commercial fee
is $42, while the median Medicaid fee is $24.3 Figure 2.2 illustrates fee differences by
plotting median reimbursement rates to dentists for eight common procedures over the
period of my analysis. The Medicaid fees for these procedures range from $3 for a single
X-ray (‘Intraoral periapical first film’4) to about $60 for a simple filling (‘Amalgam, one
surface’). Medicaid fees are fixed over this time period. Commercial fees are not fixed, but
they change very little. The difference between HKD and Medicaid rates is therefore fairly
constant. For all procedures, Delta rates are significantly higher than the corresponding
Medicaid amount, but the magnitude of the gap varies substantially across procedures. For
instance, both Medicaid and Delta pay under $10 for a single X-ray (‘Intraoral periapical
first film’). Medicaid reimbursement rate for prophylaxis5, however, is $24, while the
corresponding amount for dentists in the Delta network is $42.6
2.2 Data
The main data for the analysis come from the Michigan Department of Community
Health. The first set of files is Medicaid enrollment files that cover the time period between
3To make this comparison, I first compute median reimbursement per procedure in non-HKD counties.
I then average over these median reimbursement rates, weighting each procedure by the number of claims
corresponding to it. I use a similar construction for HKD counties.
4Intraoral periapical film is radiograph that is taken with X-ray film placed inside the patient’s mouth.
5Oral prophylaxis is a dental procedure that removes tartar and plaque build-up from the teeth through
polishing and scaling. This normally involves cleaning under the gums and the surface of the teeth. The
procedure helps to prevent tooth decay, gum disease and staining. Since braces make it hard to clean teeth
and gums, it is also recommended for those who are getting braces or other orthodontic work. The procedure
is generally performed by an experienced dental hygienist or dentist.
6In percentage terms, the increase in reimbursement rates ranges from 0 for resin-based composites to 79
percent for intraoral periapical film.
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2007 and 2012. Monthly enrollment in the HKD program is determined based on a child’s
county of residence in that month. In addition to each child’s county of residence, the
files contain basic demographic data (race, age and gender), and whether a child’s dental
coverage is Healthy Kids Dental or standard Medicaid fee-for-service. The study popula-
tion includes all children below the age of 21 who were enrolled in Medicaid for at least
three consecutive months every six months (97.83 percent of observations). I also exclude
children with a missing county of residence (0.02 percent of the observations) and chil-
dren whose longest county of residence does not line up with the indicator variable for
enrollment in HKD vs Medicaid (0.75 percent of the observations). The above exclusion
restrictions have no effect on the mean of each outcome. I assign children to county groups
based on the coverage for the majority of their enrollment period. The county groups con-
sidered in this analysis are the ‘old HKD’ counties (the 59 counties that had implemented
HKD prior to fiscal year 2007), transition’08 counties (the 2 counties that transitioned to
HKD in July 2008), transition’12 counties (the 4 counties that transitioned to HKD by
February 2012) and ‘non-HKD counties’ (the 18 counties that remained on Medicaid as of
January 2013).
The second set of files is dental claims data from Michigan Department of Community
Health. They cover the time period between 2007 and 2012 and include the information
on the date of the visit, the procedures provided and the amount reimbursed. I combine
enrollment files with claims files and exclude from the sample children who appear in the
claims files but not in enrollment files (1.72 percent of claims). The resulting data set is
based on about 5.8 million children between July 2007 and June 2012. It is on the level of
county and six-month period (January to June and July to December).7 This aggregation
is convenient, since reimbursement rates vary at the county level and six-month periods
ensure that the outcomes of interest are relatively stable over time and are easily interpreted.
7Each county corresponds to the child’s county of residence, since that is the level at which the policy
varies: if a child on Medicaid residing in an HKD county goes to the dentist office in another county, that
dentist is still reimbursed at HKD rates. The resulting use of dental care appears in the data under the county
of child’s residence.
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I identify dentists participating in Medicaid by using the variable ‘rendering NPI.’ Out
of some 6,000 dentists registered in Michigan between 2007 and 2011,8 4,212 participate
in Medicaid. The average number of dentists participating in Medicaid per participating
dental practice is 1.1. This number is not directly comparable to the number of dentists per
dental practices, since I only observe a subset of dentists who treat children on Medicaid.9
The unit of observation is county and six-month period. If a single dentist treats children on
Medicaid from two different counties, then she serves two different counties and is recorded
as two separate dentists. This approach prevents me from measuring the total number
of dentists treating children on Medicaid in Michigan, but it allows me to measure the
number of dentists serving children on Medicaid in each county. I identify dental practices
participating in Medicaid by using the variable ‘billing NPI.’ This variable is missing for
18 percent of claims. Since the name of the practice, ‘billing NPI name,’ is never missing,
I use the non-missing billing NPI to infer missing billing NPI based on the name of each
dental practice. Between 2007 and 2011, 4,452 dental practices participate in Medicaid.
I use data from several other sources to account for changes that may affect both the
supply of dental care and Medicaid coverage. Changes in unemployment rates may cause
individuals to lose private dental insurance, both for themselves and for their children, and
become eligible for Medicaid, so I control for county-level unemployment rate. These data
come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).10 I also control for the fraction of children
between the ages of 0 and 18 below the federal poverty line and for the median household
income in each county and year. This information is part of the Small Area Income and
Poverty Estimates (SAIPE), based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS).
Since these data are yearly, I interpolate them to the six-month period. I control for changes
8The number of dentists registered in Michigan increased slightly from 5,817 to 6,138 between 2007 and
2011 (ADA 2007-2011).
9Buchmueller et al (2014) find that the average 1.9 dentists per dental practice on average in the U.S.
between 1999 and 2011 (Buchmueller et al, 2014).
10Unemployment data are available on a monthly basis. To combine them with administrative data from
the Michigan Department of Community Health, I compute average unemployment rate from July of one
year to June of the next year.
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in the supply of dental care by using the number of dentists in each county and year per pop-
ulation in 1,000s. This information comes from the American Dental Association. Finally,
because access to care varies across rural and urban counties, I use county-level rural-urban
continuum codes compiled by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).11 For
each six-month period between 2007 and 2013, each county is assigned a code between
1 and 9; 9 corresponds to the most rural counties, and 1 corresponds to the most urban
counties.12
2.3 Descriptive Evidence
To characterize the supply of dental care, I focus on the average number of dentists
in Medicaid per county and six-month period across different sets of counties (Panel 1 of
Table 2.3). As reimbursement rates increased from the ‘pre’ period to the ’post’ period, the
average number of dentists participating in Medicaid per county in transition’08 counties
increases from 199 to 241. It declined to its original levels between January 2010 and June
2011 but then increased to 226 in the final sample period. The average number of dentists
serving children on Medicaid declined steadily in the old HKD counties and increased
slightly in the non-HKD counties. It remained mostly unchanged in transition’12 counties
before 2012, when reimbursement rates increased in these counties.
By raising the profits from treating patients on Medicaid, increased reimbursement rates
may lead to an average increase in the volume of Medicaid patients per each dentist par-
ticipating in the program. I test this hypothesis by focusing on the number of visits from
11These data are available for download at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/
rural-urban-continuum-codes.aspx#.U993c_lkSSo.
12Counties in metro areas of 1 million population or more are assigned the value of 1. Counties in metro
areas of 250,000 to 1 million population are assigned the value of 2. Counties in metro areas of fewer than
250,000 population are assigned the value of 3. Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area
are assigned the value of 4. Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area are assigned the
value of 5. Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area are assigned the value of 6. Urban
population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area are assigned the value of 7. Completely rural or
less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area are assigned the value of 8. Completely rural or
less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area are assigned the value of 9.
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children on Medicaid per participating dentist. The second panel of Table 2.3 reports this
variable across the three sets of counties over time. The number of visits from children on
Medicaid per participating dentist increases steadily across the four sets of counties. The
increase of 34.6(=(70-52)/52) percent in transition’08 counties is smaller than the increase
of 62.5 in the old HKD counties but larger than the 31.2 percent in the non-HKD counties,
so increased participation of dentists in Medicaid does not seem to increase the number of
children on Medicaid per dentist.
Lack of increased participation in Medicaid among dentists treating children on Medi-
caid may be due to consolidation of participating dentists into dental practices. To provide
suggestive evidence for this hypothesis, I plot the number of dentists treating children on
Medicaid per dental practice participating in Medicaid in Figures 2.3- 2.4. Figure 2.3 re-
veals a trend away from consolidation of participating dentists into dental practices in tran-
sition’08 counties as reimbursement rates increase. The opposite is true for dentists serving
children on Medicaid in transition’12 counties (Figure 2.4). Since most of the increase in
provider participation comes from providers treating few children on Medicaid (Figures ??
and ??), this trend towards consolidation may confound the effect of increased reimburse-
ment on the number of dentists serving children on Medicaid in transition’12 counties, this
trend towards consolidation may confound the effect of increased reimbursement on the
number of dentists serving children on Medicaid in transition’12 counties.
Two outcomes capture changes in both the demand and access to dental care. The
first outcome is the percentage of children on Medicaid with at least one dental visit in
each county and six-month period. About 26 percent of children enrolled in Medicaid end
up receiving care in transition’08 counties before reimbursement rates are increased, in
the ‘pre’ period (Panel 1 of Table 2.4).13 This is well below the recommended two visits
per year even for healthy children (AAPD, 2009). It increases to 32 percent immediately
13The patterns of dental care use are persistent over time: 75 percent of those who do not go to the dentist
this year have no dental visit in the following year either, while 67 percent of those with at least one visit to
the dentist office in a year come back in the next year.
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after reimbursement rates are increased and to 39 percent by the end of 2012. Overall,
the rate increases of 13 percentage points (=39-26) over this time period is substantial. It is
equivalent to the 13 percentage point increase in the old HKD counties and larger than the 7
percent increase in the non-HKD counties. A similar pattern is observed for the number of
dental visits per enrolled child in each county and six-month period (Panel 2 of Table 2.4):
the 20 percentage point increase in the number of visits observed between 2007 and 2012
in transition’08 counties is much larger than the 6 percentage point increase in the old HKD
counties or the 13 percentage point increase in the non-HKD counties.
2.4 Econometric Framework
I estimate the effect of increases in reimbursement rates to providers on provider par-
ticipation and the use of dental care using a difference-in-difference (DID) approach. My
approach is to compare changes in the outcome between children on Medicaid in transi-
tion counties and children on Medicaid in non-transition counties (old HKD or non-HKD)
before and after reimbursement rates are increased:
Yct = α1HKDct +Xctα2 +µc+ τt + εct (2.1)
In this model Yct represents one of the key outcomes of interest (in natural logs)14, HKDct
is an indicator variable that equals one if HKD was in place in county c during year t, µc
is a set of county indicator variables, τt is a set of indicator variables for each six-month
period and εct is an i.i.d. disturbance term. Xct includes a linear time trend specific to
non-HKD counties, a linear time trend specific to the old HKD counties, a linear time trend
specific to transition’08 counties and a linear time trend specific to transition’12 counties. It
also includes the fraction of children (0-19 years old) below poverty line, median household
14The residuals are strongly positively skewed, so the transformation helps to obtain residuals that are ap-
proximately symmetrically distributed around zero. In addition, Michigan counties vary significantly by size,
so a log-linear specification is more likely to correctly capture the relationship between increased reimburse-
ment and the supply of dental care. The results are similar in the linear specification.
56
income, number of dentists per population, fraction of unemployed population (in 1,000’s),
binary measures of county rurality, share of children in each age group (1-5, 6-10, 11-16,
17-20), share of girls on Medicaid, and share of children on Medicaid by race (black, non-
white other than black)15.
County fixed effects mitigate the bias that may occur if time-invariant county charac-
teristics (e.g. opportunity costs) drive the supply of dental care. The use of county fixed
effects means that identification comes from changes in within counties and over time.
In other words, α1 measures the change in the outcome as reimbursement rates increase.
Time-varying control variables help to account for county-specific shocks that may drive
the supply of dental care. For example, greater unemployment rate reduces the availability
of private patients, thereby reducing dentists’ opportunity costs. Time dummy variables
capture any difference over time that may affect dental providers serving children on Medi-
caid (e.g. regulation). Linear time trends specific to each set of counties allow me to control
for differential trends in the outcomes across counties over time. For example, Table 2.3
reveals a steady increase in the number of children on Medicaid per participating dentist
across all four sets of counties over time. Such pattern would bias the estimated effect of
reimbursement rates on the outcome of interest if I simply compared its values before and
after the increase in reimbursement. Since I compare the change in the outcome in transi-
tion’08 counties relative to other counties net of time trends that are specific to each set of
county, this problem is mitigated.
I estimate the model using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS). In order to con-
duct correct inference in the presence of serial correlation in the error term within counties
and over time, I compute standard errors clustered at the county level (Wooldridge, 2002).
Some specifications allow for differences between transition’08 and transition’12 counties,
and shorter run (first 1.5 years) vs. the longer run (second 1.5 years).
The difference-in-difference framework assumes no differential trend between providers
15The last three sets of variables change very little over the time period.
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participating in Medicaid in transition’08 counties and their counterparts in other counties
in the period before the introduction of the program. To test this parallel trend assumption,
I restrict the sample to the period before July 2008 in the following specification:
Yct =γ1old HKDc+ γ2non HKDc+ γ3Tt
+ γ4old HKDc ∗Tt + γ5non HKDc ∗Tt + γ6Xct +µc+ εct
(2.2)
where Yct is the outcome of interest in county c and month t, old HKDc takes on the
value of 1 for all transition’08 counties before July 2008, non HKDc takes on the value
of 1 for all non-transition counties, T is a linear time trend that takes on values from 1 to
3, Xct represents a full set of variables that control for differences in the supply and the
demand for dental care, µc are county fixed effects, and τt are time fixed effects. Since the
omitted category is transition’08 counties, a large and significant coefficient on the inter-
action terms for a particular set of counties implies that the use of care grew at a different
rate among children on Medicaid in these counties relative to transition counties. For ease
of presentation, I exclude transition’12 counties from the estimation of model (2.2). In a
separate analysis, I restrict the sample to the period before January 2012 and exclude tran-
sition’08 counties from the analysis to test whether the outcomes trend at different rates in
the non-HKD counties and the old-HKD counties relative to transition’12 counties.
Results from estimating model (2.2) are presented in Table 2.5. The first column
presents the results for the log number of dentists serving children on Medicaid. Time
captures any trend in the outcome through time, HKD ∗Time measures the difference in
trends between the old HKD counties and transition’08 counties, HKD ∗ Time measures
any difference in trends between the non-HKD counties and transition’08 counties. All
estimated coefficients are insignificant in column (1), suggesting that the there is no differ-
ence in the trend of the outcome across different sets of counties. The results are analogous
for the number of children on Medicaid per participating dentist (column 2). Columns (3)
and (4) reveal upwards trends in the share of children on Medicaid with at least one dental
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visits and the number of Medicaid visits per child in the old HKD counties but not in the
non-HKD counties. Since upward trends in the old-HKD counties relative to transition’08
counties may lead to a downward bias in the estimated α1 in model (2.1), non-HKD coun-
ties provide a better counterfactual for the experience of transition’08 counties absent the
increase in reimbursement rates.
I account for differential trends in the outcomes across counties more flexibly through
an event-study model:
Yct = γ1
11
∑
j=1
M j+ γ2
13
∑
j=1
TransctM j+ γ3Xct + εct , (2.3)
where each M j=1 in the jth 6-month period to/from the introduction of the program (the
omitted 6-month period starts in July 2008, j= 4), Transct=1 children residing in transition
counties at time t, and Xct is a set of variables that control for the supply and the demand
of dental care, as before. Some of the DID estimates are based on a model that excludes
the old HKD counties from the analysis. To make the event-study estimates comparable to
the DID estimates, I also exclude these counties from model (2.3). γ1 represent the time
path for the outcome variable relative to the period of the policy change, and γ2 capture the
difference in the outcome between children on Medicaid in transition counties and those in
non-HKD counties. If greater reimbursement rates increase the supply of dental care, then
γ2 should become positive and statistically after the period of policy change.
2.5 Results
Previous studies have found that low Medicaid reimbursement rates lead to low partic-
ipation of providers in Medicaid (GAO, 2000; Eklund et al, 2003; Buchemueller, 2013).
I show how HKD has affected participation of dentists in Medicaid (Tables 2.7). I distin-
guish between transition’08 counties and transition’12 counties in column 1. Column 2
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presents the results for a pre and post analysis. I distinguish between the short-run16 and
the long-run17 in column 3. Column 4 presents estimates that are analogous to column 2
except that the comparison group is non-HKD counties only.
I examine the effect of increased reimbursement rates on the number of dentists (in nat-
ural log’s) participating in Medicaid in Table 2.7. The increase in the number of dentists
due to increased reimbursement rates is large, at 36.1 percent in transition’08 counties. It
is equivalent to an increase in the number of dentists from 199 to 271. No analogous ef-
fect is observed in transition’12 counties: the effect of increased reimbursement rates on
the log number of dentists is estimated at very close to 0. As discussed above, consolida-
tion of dentists serving children on Medicaid in transition’12 counties into dental practices
may provide one explanation for the difference in the change of provider participation in
Medicaid across transition’08 counties and transition’12 counties as reimbursement rates
increase. Not surprisingly, averaging over the effects across the two sets of counties yields
a smaller increase of 14.2 percent (column 2). The effect of increased reimbursement on
provider participation is similar in the short-run and the long-run (p-value=0.420) (column
3). Average effect of increased reimbursement rates on the log number of dentists partici-
pating in Medicaid is similar in magnitude when compared to only the old HKD counties
(column 4) and only non-HKD counties (column 5). Evaluated at the sample means for
the data, the point estimate in the preferred specification in column 5 of of 13.1 percent
translates into the elasticity of supply of 0.175. This estimate is similar to the supply elas-
ticity that Sloan et al. (1978) and Decker (2007) estimate in their studies of physician
participation in Medicaid.
Increased reimbursement rates may lead to an average increase in the volume of chil-
dren on Medicaid per participating dentist. To capture the extent of provider participation
in the program, I focus on the number of children on Medicaid per participating dentist.
16Short− run=1 for all counties c within 18 months of the increase in reimbursement rates, so most of the
identification comes from transition’08 counties.
17Long− run=1 for all counties c 18 months after the increase in reimbursement rates, so the effect is
identified off of transition’08 counties as well as the old HKD counties.
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In line with a shift from in the number of dental visits among children on Medicaid away
from dentists with many children on Medicaid to dentists with few children on Medicaid
observed in Figure 2.3, the number of dental visits from children on Medicaid reduces
by 17 from 111 to 94 in transition’08 counties (column 1). Consistent with no effect of
increased reimbursement rates on the number of dentists serving children on Medicaid in
transition’12 counties on average, the number of dental visits by children on Medicaid does
not change in transition’12 counties as reimbursement rates increase. As expected, averag-
ing over the effect of increased reimbursement rates across the two sets of counties reduces
the estimate (column 2). The short-run effect is similar to the long-run effect (column 3),
revealing a persistent decline in the load of children on Medicaid through time as a result of
the increase in reimbursement rates. Finally, the estimated effect is similar, when only the
old HKD counties or only non-HKD counties as used as counterfactuals for the experience
of transition’08 counties.18
Results so far suggest that, on the one hand, increased reimbursement rates increase
provider participation in transition’08 counties, and, in the long-run, in transition’08 coun-
ties and the old HKD counties. A simultaneous reduction in the number of visits by chil-
dren on Medicaid in these counties, however, suggests that the use of dental care may not
increase as a result of increased reimbursement rates. To examine the implications of the
increase in provider participation on the use of dental care, I focus on the number of chil-
dren on Medicaid (in natural log’s) with any dental care (Table 2.8). The average increase
of 11.8 percent across transition’08 counties and transition’12 counties is small relative to
the increase in provider participation in Medicaid (column 2). In the preferred specification
in column 4, the increase of 11.2 percent is equivalent to the increase in the percentage of
children on Medicaid in transition counties with any dental care increased from 27.2 per-
18One may be concerned that the estimated effects of increased reimbursement rates on provider partic-
ipation are driven by outliers: a few providers treating large volumes of children on Medicaid. I therefore
estimate model (2.1) after excluding from the sample the counties and six-month period for which the out-
come variables of interest is above the 95th percentile. The estimated effects are similar in magnitude, so they
are not reported here.
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cent (=3,712/ 13,627) to 30.3 percent (=1.112*3,712/ 13,627) (column 2). This increase is
still much below the recommended one dental visit every six months. The short-run effect
of 7.4 percent is somewhat below the longer-run effect of 10.6 percent (p-value=0.094).
The effect of increased reimbursement on the number of dental visits among children
on Medicaid is even smaller than that on the number of children on Medicaid with any
dental care (p-value≤0.001 for all comparisons of analogous specifications in Table 2.8
and Table 2.9). The average increase of 4.7 percent in the preferred specification in col-
umn 4 of Table 2.9 is very small and statistically insignificant. The largest increase in the
number of dental visits among children on Medicaid that I cannot reject is 12.1 percent
(=0.047+1.96*0.038). If present, it would increase the number of dental visits per child
enrolled in Medicaid from from 0.589 dental visits per child enrolled in Medicaid from
0.589 to 0.660.
One may be concerned that enrollment in Medicaid changes with increases in reim-
bursement rates. For example, children may enroll in Medicaid in expectation of receiving
high-quality dental care. If increased enrollment in Medicaid drives increases in the use
of dental care, then the estimated effect of increased reimbursement rates on the number
of dental visits could be biased upward. To test for changes in Medicaid enrollment that
may coincide with changes in reimbursement rates, I estimate model (2.1) for enrollment
in Medicaid as a dependent variable.
Table 2.10 reports the results. I distinguish between transition’08 counties and transi-
tion’12 counties in column 1. There is no evidence that the number of children enrolled in
Medicaid changes in either transition’08 or transition’12 counties. I fail to reject that the
effect of transition on Medicaid enrollment is jointly significant (p-value=0.1606). The sec-
ond column combines the transition’08 counties and transition’12 counties and uses both
the old HKD counties and the non-HKD counties for comparison. The resulting reduction
of 1,265 is significant at the 10-percent significance level. The small reduction of 9 percent
relative to average enrollment of 13,627 may reflect greater scrutiny towards who qualifies
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for the program. The difference is no longer significant when I compare Medicaid enroll-
ment in transition’08 counties to that in only the non-HKD counties that are more similar
to transition’08 counties and therefore provide a better counterfactual for their experience
(Table 2.2).
The difference-in-difference strategy assumes to differential trend in the outcome across
different sets of counties. The results in Table 2.5 from the estimation of model (2.3)
support the validity of this assumption. Still, I account for potential differential trends
in the outcomes across counties more flexibly using an event-study model. Figures 2.5
- 2.8 plot the estimated γ2 coefficients from model (2.3) that capture the difference in the
outcome for children on Medicaid in the transition counties and children on Medicaid in
non-HKD counties relative to the period of the policy change. Dashed lines represent 95
percent confidence intervals for each coefficient. For each figure, there is no evidence of
differential trends in the outcome between children on Medicaid in transition counties and
their counterparts in non-HKD counties. This finding validates my empirical strategy, as it
suggests that both groups experienced similar trends in the outcomes prior to the increase in
reimbursement rates. Event-study estimates in Figures 2.5 - 2.8 are in line with the results
from the difference-in-difference estimation in Tables 2.7- 2.9.
2.6 Alternative measure of provider participation
An alternative measure of provider participation in Medicaid is the number of dental
practices participating in Medicaid. I tabulate this outcome across the four sets of counties
over time in Panel 1 of Table B.1. Transition’08 counties experience an increase in the
number of dental practices participating in Medicaid from 197 to 242 between 2008 and
2009 and a decline in the outcome to 174 by 2012. This is a 12(=(242-197)/197) percent
decline relative to the number of dentists in 2008. The number of dental practices also
declines even more dramatically across all other sets of counties: the largest decline is
observed in transition’12 counties, at 54.5 percent, and the smallest decline is observed
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in the old HKD counties, at 36.1 percent. Given that there is no decline in the number
of dentists over time (Table 2.3), this observation suggests that dentists participating in
Medicaid consolidate into dental practices. In line with this hypothesis, average number of
dental visits by children on Medicaid per participating practice increases steadily across all
types of counties, from 48.2 percent in transition’08 counties to 122 percent in transition’12
counties (Panel 2 of Table B.1).
I estimate the effect of increased reimbursement rates on the number of dental practices
participating in Medicaid (in natural log’s) in Tables B.2- B.3. Column 1 of Table B.2 indi-
cates that the number the dental practices participating in Medicaid increased by some 50
percent in both transition’08 counties and transition’12 counties as reimbursement rates in-
creased. Such substantial effects in transition’12 counties are in sharp contrast to no change
in the number of dentists participating in Medicaid in transition’12 counties found in Ta-
bles 2.7. In addition, the long-run effect of increased reimbursement rates on the number
of dental practices participating in Medicaid of 12.7 percent appears much smaller than its
short-run effect of 42.5 percent (mean=78). Evaluated at the sample means for the data, the
point estimate in the preferred specification in column 5 of of 45.9 percent translates into
the elasticity of supply of 0.615. The smallest increase in the number of dental practices
due to increased reimbursement rates that I cannot reject is an increase of 34.3 percent.
Its implied elasticity is 0.458, well above those estimated by prior studies (Sloan et al.,
1978; Decker, 2007; Baker and Royalty, 2000). The discrepancies in the effects of reim-
bursement rates on the number of dentists and the number of dental practices suggest that
organizational changes among providers present a major challenge for estimating the effect
of reimbursement rates on provider participation.
2.7 Discussion and conclusion
I find that dentists serving children on Medicaid in transition’08 counties respond to in-
creased reimbursement rates by seeing more patients on Medicaid: the number of dentists
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participating in Medicaid per county and six-month period increases by 36.1 percent on av-
erage from 199 to 271. The number of children on Medicaid per dentist, however, remains
unchanged. This observation may suggest that greater participation of dentists treating
fewer children on Medicaid comes at the expense of declines in participation of dentists
treating large volumes of children on Medicaid. In line with this hypothesis, increased re-
imbursement rates lead to very small increases in the share of children on Medicaid with
any dental care of about 3 percent (mean=0.265).
Substantial increase in provider participation and smaller increase in the use of dental
care are consistent with a shift in the source of care away from public providers (e.g. public
clinics and hospital clinics) to private providers. Consistent with this hypothesis, prior
studies found that public insurance expansions led to increased participation of providers
in public setting but not providers in private settings. In particular, Baker and Royalty
(2000) examine physician response to Medicaid eligibility expansions for pregnant women
on Medicaid. They find that the expansions increased the percentage of patients who are
poor or on Medicaid among physicians in public settings, but not among physicians in
private practices.
Because the number of dental visits among children on Medicaid increases only slightly
in response to increased reimbursement rates, the incremental cost of an additional visit
to the dentist office induced by the policy is very high. Increased reimbursement rates
lead to an average increase in the number of dental visits of 0.056, from 0.587 to 0.690
visits (Table 2.9). At the average Medicaid enrollment per county and six-month period
of 12,376 children, this increase is equivalent to an increase of 693 dental visits. Be-
cause of the increase in reimbursement rates, average reimbursement rates in transition
counties increase from $64 to $121 per dental visit. Program spending increased for all
dental visits from by $464,942(=$64*0.587 visits per child*12,376 enrolled children) to
$1,033,272(=$121*0.690 visits per child*12,376 enrolled children), so an additional visit
to the dentist office induced by the policy costs $820(=(1,033,272-464,942)/693).
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If increased reimbursement rates are evaluated based on their ability to increase the use
of dental care up to the recommended levels, then even the large increases implemented in
Michigan fall short of achieving this goal. Higher reimbursement rates may, however, have
other advantages. For example, by increasing provider participation in Medicaid, they may
allow Medicaid patients to find providers that better suit their needs (e.g. providers who
are located closer to their homes).
This analysis sets the stage for an investigation into the reasons for continued non-
participation among some providers, and for an examination of organizational and quality
differences between providers with low volumes of patients on Medicaid and those with
the largest volumes of patients on Medicaid. In addition, future work may examine some
of the benefits of increased provider participation. These may include lower incidence of
disease, shorter distance traveled, or lower absenteeism of parents to children on Medicaid.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Phase-in of Michigan’s Healthy Kids Dental program
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Figure 2.2:
Reimbursement rates for common dental procedures in Medicaid and Healthy
Kids Dental programs
Notes: An intraoral X-ray is a radiograph that is taken with X-ray film placed inside the patient’s mouth. This
is the most common method of a dental X-ray. A periapical X-ray is a specific type of intraoral X-ray that is
used to investigate the structural integrity of an individual tooth.
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Figure 2.3:
Number of dentists treating children on Medicaid per participating dental prac-
tice: Transition’08 counties in 2008 and 2009
Dental practices treating no children on Medicaid are omitted, since these data are not available.
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Figure 2.4:
Number of dentists treating children on Medicaid per participating dental prac-
tice: Transition’12 counties in 2011 and 2012
Dental practices treating no children on Medicaid are omitted, since these data are not available.
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Figure 2.5:
Effect of increased reimbursement rates on the log number of dentists partici-
pating in Medicaid: event study
73
Figure 2.6:
Effect of increased reimbursement rates on the number of children on Medicaid
per dentist participating in Medicaid: event study
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Figure 2.7:
Effect of increased reimbursement rates on the log number of children enrolled
in Medicaid with at least one dental visit: event study
Sources: Michigan Department of Community Health, American Dental Association; United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture
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Figure 2.8:
Effect of increased reimbursement rates on the log number of dental visits:
event study
Sources: Michigan Department of Community Health, American Dental Association; United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture
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Table 2.2: Key demographics across counties
Old-HKD Trans’08 Trans’12 Non-HKD
Pct below poverty, 0-18yo 21.34% 24.50% 25.25% 19.33%
Median HH income $42,578 $43,317 $41,790 $47,855
Pct unemployed 8.38% 8.20% 7.90% 7.06%
Rurality index (1-9=most rural) 6.10 2.50 5.20 3.21
Number of dentists per pop 0.40 0.53 0.34 0.57
Number of counties 59 2 4 18
Summary statistics are provided for the period between January 2007 and June 2008, before reimbursement
rates are increased in transition’08 counties.
Sources: American Community Survey; American Dental Association; United States Department of Agri-
culture
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Table 2.3: Characterizing dentists participating in Medicaid
Pre Post
Jan’07-Jun’08 Jul’08-Dec’09 Jan’10-Jun’11 Jul’11-Dec’12
Average number of dentists participating in Medicaid
Transition’08 199 241 192 226
Old HKD 71 59 54 58
Non-HKD 176 176 168 184
Transition’12 88 85 79 91
Average number of Medicaid visits per dentist
Transition’08 111 110 149 128
Old HKD 32 43 52 50
Non-HKD 71 79 95 87
Transition’12 48 57 70 66
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Table 2.4: Average use of dental care among children on Medicaid
Pre Post
Jan’07-Jun’08 Jul’08-Dec’09 Jan’10-Jun’11 Jul’11-Dec’12
Share of Medicaid children with ≥ 1 dental visit
Transition’08 0.265 0.335 0.375 0.384
Old HKD 0.316 0.356 0.392 0.395
Non-HKD 0.225 0.241 0.260 0.266
Transition’12 0.252 0.267 0.292 0.328
Average number of Medicaid dental visits per enrollee
Transition’08 0.564 0.643 0.693 0.710
Old HKD 0.653 0.703 0.742 0.752
Non-HKD 0.518 0.529 0.555 0.567
Transition’12 0.556 0.582 0.618 0.686
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Table 2.6:
The effect of increased reimbursement rates on the log number of dentists par-
ticipating in Medicaid
Ln number of participating dentists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HKD’08 0.361***
(0.046)
HKD’12 -0.003
(0.035)
HKD 0.142* 0.148 0.131***
(0.081) (0.091) (0.046)
HKD: short-run 0.171**
(0.068)
HKD: long-run 0.114***
(0.041)
Observations 913 913 913 715 264
p-value (HKD’08=HKD’12) 0.420
p-value (short-run=long-run) ≤0.001
Comparison All All All Old HKD non-HKD
Mean number of dentists in transition’08 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 199.
Mean number of dentists in transition’12 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 85.
Mean number of dentists across all transition counties in the ‘pre’ period (July ’08 for transition’08 counties
and Jan’12 for transition’12 counties) is 100.
I estimate the model by using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) and cluster standard errors at the
county level.
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Table 2.7:
The effect of increased reimbursement rates on the number of visits from chil-
dren on Medicaid per dentist participating in Medicaid
Number of Medicaid visits per participating dentist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HKD’08 -17.424***
(3.833)
HKD’12 2.046
(6.433)
HKD -5.683 -5.007 -7.515
(5.731) (5.547) (5.089)
HKD: short-run -12.387**
(5.914)
HKD: long-run -8.212***
(2.303)
Observations 913 913 913 715 264
p-value (HKD’08=HKD’12) 0.495
p-value (short-run=long-run) 0.0104
Observations 913 913 913 715 264
p-value (HKD’08=HKD’12) 0.966
p-value (short-run=long-run) 0.031
Comparison All All All Old HKD non-HKD
Mean number of visits from children on Medicaid per participating dentist in transition’08 counties in the
‘pre’ period is 111.
Mean number of visits from children on Medicaid per participating dentist in transition’12 counties in the
‘pre’ period is 59.
Mean number of visits from children on Medicaid per participating dentist across all transition counties in
the ‘pre’ period (July ’08 for transition’08 counties and Jan’12 for transition’12 counties) is 66.
I estimate the model by using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) and cluster standard errors at the
county level.
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Table 2.8:
The effect of increased reimbursement rates on the share of children on Medicaid
with at least one dental visit
Share of children w/ ≥1 visit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HKD’08 0.032***
(0.009)
HKD’12 0.066***
(0.014)
HKD 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.047***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009)
HKD: short-run 0.037***
(0.012)
HKD: long-run 0.007
(0.005)
Observations 913 913 913 715 264
p-value (HKD’08=HKD’12) 0.018
p-value (short-run=long-run) 0.038
Comparison All All All Old HKD non-HKD
Mean share of children w/ ≥1 visit in transition’08 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 0.265, so the estimate
in column (1) implies that the share of children on Medicaid with at least one dental visit in transition’08
counties increased from 0.265 to 0.297 with the increase in reimbursement rates.
Mean share of children w/ ≥1 visit in transition’12 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 0.274, so the estimate
in column (2) implies that the share of children on Medicaid with at least one dental visit in transition’08
counties increased from 0.274 to 0.340 with the increase in reimbursement rates.
Mean share of children w/ ≥1 visit in transition counties in the ‘pre’ period is 0.272, so the estimate in
column (3) implies that the share of children on Medicaid with at least one dental visit in transition’08
counties increased from 0.272 to 0.325 with the increase in reimbursement rates.
I estimate the model by using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) and cluster standard errors at the
county level.
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Table 2.9:
The effect of increased reimbursement rates on the number of dental visits by
children on Medicaid per enrollee
Number of dental visits per enrollee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HKD’08 0.037***
(0.008)
HKD’12 0.098***
(0.025)
HKD 0.074*** 0.079*** 0.056***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
HKD: short-run 0.050**
(0.020)
HKD: long-run 0.012
(0.009)
Observations 913 913 913 715 264
p-value (HKD’08=HKD’12) 0.061
p-value (short-run=long-run) 0.020
Comparison All All All Old HKD non-HKD
Mean number of dental visits per enrollee in transition’08 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 0.564, so the
estimate in column (1) implies that the number of dental visits by children on Medicaid per enrollee in
transition’08 counties increased from 0.564 to 0.601 with the increase in reimbursement rates.
Mean number of dental visits per enrollee in transition’12 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 0.590, so the
estimate in column (2) implies that the number of dental visits by children on Medicaid per enrollee in
transition’08 counties increased from 0.590 to 0.688 with the increase in reimbursement rates.
Mean number of dental visits per enrollee in transition counties in the ‘pre’ period is 0.587, so the estimate
in column (3) implies that the share of number of dental visits by children on Medicaid per enrollee in
transition’08 counties increased from 0.587 to 0.661 with the increase in reimbursement rates.
I estimate the model by using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) and cluster standard errors at the
county level.
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Table 2.10: The effect of increased reimbursement rates on enrollment for Medicaid
Number of children enrolled in Medicaid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HKD’08 -1,830
(1,365)
HKD’12 -589.5
(391.1)
HKD -1,265* -464.8* -1,362
(759.9) (241.1) (1,419)
Observations 913 913 715 264
p-value (HKD’08=HKD’12) 0.422
Comparison All All Old HKD Non-HKD
Mean number of children enrolled in Medicaid in transition’08 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 40,690.
Mean number of children enrolled in Medicaid in transition’12 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 9,568.
Mean number of children enrolled in Medicaid across all transition counties in the ‘pre’ period (July ’08
for transition’08 counties and Jan’12 for transition’12 counties) is 13,627, so the estimate in column (3)
implies that the number of children enrolled in Medicaid in transition counties declined by 9 percent
from 13,627 to 12,362 with the increase in reimbursement rates. This effect is no longer statistically sig-
nificant when only non-HKD counties are used as counterfactuals for the experience of the transition counties.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.1: Core and Topical Modules from SIPP panel data
# individuals
Module 1 Module 2
Panel 2001
# respondents 2001 71,280
# respondents 2002 69,143
# respondents 2003 65,901 67,530
Panel 2004
# respondents 2004 99,978
# respondents 2005 94,617 95,856
# respondents 2006
Panel 2008
# respondents 2009 91,219
# respondents 2010 85,397 88,164
# respondents 2011 79,231 82,260
Total 656,766 333,810
SIPP is collected in a series of panels. Each panel includes ‘topical modules’ with detailed questions on
specific subjects that are conducted with varying frequency. Module 1 refers to the ‘Medical Expenses and
Utilization of Health Care’ Module, and Module 2 refers to the ‘Adult Well-Being’ Module.
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Table A.2:
Testing for the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on Medicaid enrollment
Medicaid coverage
(1) (2) (3)
Time -0.005* 0.010** -0.017*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
Dental, drop -0.007* -0.004 -0.025*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.014)
Time*Dental, drop 0.001* 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 589,052 190,103 69,373
R2 0.24 0.24 0.36
Restriction None Parents Disabled
I measure state economic conditions with gross state product (GSP) per capita. I measure conditions in state
health care markets with the number of community health clinics per capita and the number of dentists per
capita.
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at state level. Unit
of observation is state and year.
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Table A.3:
Effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the probability of yearly dentist
office visit: probit estimates
Prob of dentist office visits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full dental 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.052
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.047)
Medicaid 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.017 0.018
(0.022) (0.024) (0.039) (0.016)
Medicaid*Full dental 0.082*** 0.100*** 0.084*** 0.128***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
N 451,563 142,733 86,312 28,513
R2 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.05
Mean of dep. Var., Medicaid 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.38
Restriction Full sample ≤2*FPL Parents, ≤2*FPL Disabled, ≤2*FPL
The table reports coefficient estimates from the probit model for the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage
on the probability of yearly dentist office visit. The coefficient on Medicaid ∗Full dental is computed by
taking a cross derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable (Norton et al, 2004).
The regression includes year, interview month, and state fixed effects, state-specific time trends, and controls
for gender, race, age, private health insurance, Medicare coverage, family income, GSP per capita, fraction
of state population with access to fluoridated water, and number of dentists per capita.
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at state level. Unit
of observation is individual and year.
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Table A.4:
Effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the probability of at least one visit
to the doctor’s office
Prob ≥1 doctor visit
Full dental 0.002
(0.007)
Medicaid 0.251***
(0.008)
Full dental*Medicaid 0.014
(0.010)
N 451,563
R2 0.14
Mean of dep. var., Medicaid 0.86
The table reports coefficient estimates for the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the probability of
at least one visit to the doctor’s office.
The regression includes year, interview month, and state fixed effects, state-specific time trends, and controls
for gender, race, age, private health insurance, Medicare coverage, family income, GSP per capita, fraction
of state population with access to fluoridated water, and number of dentists per capita.
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at state level. Unit
of observation is individual and year.
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Table A.5:
Effects of Medicaid dental care coverage on the use of dental care through time
Prob of dentist office visit
(1) (2) (3)
Full dental 0.001 0.017 0.027**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Medicaid 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Full dental*Medicaid 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.100***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Full dental*Medicaid*Year0 0.029*
(0.016)
Full dental*Medicaid*Year1 0.033*
(0.017)
Full dental*Medicaid*Year2 0.028*
(0.016)
Full dental*Medicaid*Year3 0.030
(0.018)
Full dental*Medicaid*Year3+ 0.024
(0.029)
N 432,490 412,758 412,758
R2 0.146 0.147 0.147
Mean of dep. var., Medicaid 0.41
Impl year No Yes Yes
The table reports coefficient estimates from the linear probability model for effect of Medicaid dental care
coverage on the probability of yearly dentist office visit.
All regressions exclude the year of implementation. In columns 2 and 3, I restrict the sample to individuals
in years for which their state of residence either added or did not change Medicaid dental care coverage. In
column 3, I allow the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage to vary in the first three years after the policy
change.
Each regression includes year, interview month, and state fixed effects, state-specific time trends, and
controls for gender, race, age, private health insurance, Medicare coverage, family income, GSP per capita,
fraction of state population with access to fluoridated water, and number of dentists per capita.
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at state level. Unit
of observation is individual and year.
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Table A.8: Number of ED visits for dental disease in California from various data sources
Source Outcome 2005 2006 200
SEDD Number of ED visits for dental disease 71,474 76,513 86,506
Medicaid 22,101 23,251 26,759
OSHPD Number of ED visits for dental disease 70,578 76,054 81,508
Medicaid 22,585 24,337 26,083
Source Outcome 2005 2007 2009
SEDD Number of adults1 with ≥1 ED visit per pop 0.22 0.22 0.23
Medicaid 0.27 0.26 0.27
CHIS2 Number of adults1 ≥1 ED visit per pop 0.19 0.19 0.19
Medicaid 0.31 0.31 0.29
1 Adults are defined as individuals of age 18 or older. 2Estimates from this telephone survey are based on
43,000-51,000 adults, depending on the year.
Sources: HCUP SEDD, Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD)
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Table A.9:
Effect of Medicaid dental care coverage on the probability of preventable dental
disease among ED patients: probit estimates.
Prob of dental disease, ED patients
Full dental -0.005
(0.011)
Medicaid -0.002
(0.001)
Mediciad * Full dental -0.001**
(0.001)
N 7,512,858
R2 0.01
Mean of dep. var. 0.04
The table reports coefficient estimates from a probit model for the effect of Medicaid dental care coverage
in California on the probability of preventable dental disease among ED patients. The coefficient on
Medicaid ∗Full dental is computed by taking a cross derivative of expected value of the dependent variable
(Norton et al, 2004).
Preventable dental disease is dental disease that could have been prevented at an earlier time (Table A.7).
Estimates are based on 25 percent of the sample.
The model includes county fixed effects, month-year time trend, month-year Medicaid-specific month-year
time trend, indicator variables for each month, indicator variables for gender, race, and age category, and
time-varying county characteristics: number of dentists per capita, number of CHC per capita, fraction of
employment in 14 major 2-digit NAICS industries, and unemployment rate.
24% of the sample are on Medicare, 17% are on Medicaid, 34% have private insurance, and 19% are
uninsured. The unit of observation is individual and month.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 2
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Figure B.1:
Number of dental practices treating different volumes of children on Medicaid:
Transition’08 counties in 2008 and 2009
Dental practices treating no children on Medicaid are omitted, since these data are not available.
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Figure B.2:
Number of dental practices treating different volumes of children on Medicaid:
Transition’12 counties in 2011 and 2012
Dental practices treating no children on Medicaid are omitted, since these data are not available.
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Figure B.3:
Effect of increased reimbursement rates on the log number of dental practices
participating in Medicaid: event study
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Figure B.4:
Effect of increased reimbursement rates on the number of children on Medicaid
per dental practice participating in Medicaid: event study
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Table B.1: Characterizing dental practices participating in Medicaid
Pre Post
Jan’07-Jun’08 Jul’08-Dec’09 Jan’10-Jun’11 Jul’11-Dec’12
Average number of practices participating in Medicaid
Transition’08 197 242 197 174
Old HKD 72 57 54 46
Non-HKD 172 137 120 120
Transition’12 85 55 47 55
Average number of children on Medicaid per practice
Transition’08 112 109 146 166
Old HKD 32 46 53 64
Non-HKD 74 106 138 139
Transition’12 50 90 119 111
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Table B.2:
The effect of increased reimbursement rates on the log number of dental prac-
tices participating in Medicaid
Ln number of practices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HKD’08 0.561***
(0.035)
HKD’12 0.497***
(0.042)
HKD 0.522*** 0.556*** 0.459***
(0.031) (0.026) (0.059)
HKD: short-run 0.425***
(0.030)
HKD: long-run 0.127***
(0.037)
Observations 913 913 913 715 264
p-value (HKD’08=HKD’12) ≤0.001
p-value (short-run=long-run) 0.258
Observations 913 913 913 264 869
Comparison All All All Old HKD non-HKD
Mean number of dental practices in transition’08 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 197, so the estimate in
column (1) implies that the mean number of dental practices participating in Medicaid in transition’08
counties increased by 56.1 percent from 197 to 308 per county and six-month period with the increase in
reimbursement rates.
Mean number of dental practices in transition’12 counties in the ‘pre’ period is 61, so the estimate in column
(2) implies that the mean number of dental practices participating in Medicaid in transition’12 counties
increased by 49.7 percent from 61 to 91 per county and six-month period with the increase in reimbursement
rates.
Mean number of dental practices across all transition counties in the ‘pre’ period (July ’08 for transition’08
counties and Jan’12 for transition’12 counties) is 78, so the estimate in column (3) implies that the mean
number of dental practices participating in Medicaid in transition counties increased by 52.2 percent from 78
to 119 per county and six-month period with the increase in reimbursement rates.
I estimate the model by using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) and cluster standard errors at the
county level.
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Table B.3:
The effect of increased reimbursement rates on the number of visits from chil-
dren on Medicaid per dental practice participating in Medicaid
Number of Medicaid visits per participating practice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HKD’08 -17.495***
(1.539)
HKD’12 -16.162***
(5.262)
HKD -16.691*** -17.163*** -18.697***
(3.251) (3.038) (4.414)
HKD: short-run -14.003***
(2.376)
HKD: long-run -4.925***
(1.511)
Observations 913 913 913 715 264
p-value (HKD’08=HKD’12) 0.001
p-value (short-run=long-run) 0.808
Comparison All All All Old HKD non-HKD
Mean number of visits from children on Medicaid per participating practice in transition’08 counties in the
‘pre’ period is 112.
Mean number of visits from children on Medicaid per participating practice in transition’12 counties in the
‘pre’ period is 90.
Mean number of visits from children on Medicaid per participating practice across all transition counties in
the ‘pre’ period (July ’08 for transition’08 counties and Jan’12 for transition’12 counties) is 93.
I estimate the model by using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) and cluster standard errors at the
county level.
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